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DNA BY THE ENTIRETY
Natalie Ram
The law fails to accommodate the inconvenient fact that an
individual’s identifiable genetic information is involuntarily and
immutably shared with her close genetic relatives. Legal institutions
have established that individuals have a cognizable interest in control-
ling genetic information that is identifying to them. The Supreme Court
recognized in Maryland v. King that the Fourth Amendment is impli-
cated when arrestees’ DNA is analyzed, and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act protects individuals from genetic discrimination
in the employment and health-insurance markets. But genetic infor-
mation is not like other forms of private or personal information
because it is shared—immutably and involuntarily—in ways that are
identifying of both the source and that person’s close genetic relatives.
Standard approaches to addressing interests in genetic information
have largely failed to recognize this characteristic, treating such infor-
mation as individualistic.
While many legal frames may be brought to bear on this problem,
this Article focuses on the law of property. Specifically, looking to the
law of tenancy by the entirety, this Article proposes one possible frame-
work for grappling with the overlapping interests implicated in genetic
identification and analysis. Tenancy by the entirety, like interests in
shared identifiable genetic information, calls for the difficult task of
conceptualizing two persons as one. The law of tenancy by the entirety
thus provides a useful analytical framework for considering how legal
institutions might take interests in shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation into account. This Article examines how this framework may
shape policy approaches in three domains: forensic identification,
genetic research, and personal genetic testing. In some of these domains,
experts are already advocating for policies consistent with this
framework.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) announced
that it had reached an agreement with Henrietta Lacks’s family members
governing access to Lacks’s genetic information.1 Lacks, who died of
cervical cancer in 1951 and whose cells were used in research without her
knowledge or consent, was the progenitor of the first immortal cell
line—HeLa cells.2 Those famous cells “contributed to the development
of a polio vaccine, the discovery of human telomerase and countless
other advances.”3 But for decades, no one consulted with Lacks’s family
about the use and commercial exploitation of those cells, even as some
researchers continued to approach family members for more genetic
samples.4 Events came to a head in March 2013, when researchers at the
European Molecular Biology Laboratory published the full HeLa
genome.5 Family members were concerned “that personal medical infor-
mation about their family could be deduced by anyone who had the full
genome map in their possession.”6 Under the new agreement, HeLa’s full
1. Ewen Callaway, Deal Done Over HeLa Cell Line, 500 Nature 132, 132 (2013)
[hereinafter Callaway, Deal Done].
2. Id. See generally Rebecca Skloot, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010)
(discussing Lacks’s life, illness, and subsequent use of her cells).
3. Callaway, Deal Done, supra note 1, at 132.
4. Id.
5. Art Caplan, NIH Finally Makes Good with Henrietta Lacks’ Family, CNBC (Aug. 8,
2013, 8:12 AM), http://pp.pub.cnbc.com/id/100946766 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
6. Id.
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genomic data will be available on a case-by-case basis, two members of
Lacks’s family will serve on the NIH board responsible for evaluating
requests for access, and researchers using that data will be asked to
acknowledge the Lacks family in resulting publications.7
Separately, in February 2014, the Commonwealth of Virginia
secured its first conviction borne from familial searching—a new use of
existing DNA forensic technology.8 Police knew that the same man had
committed three serious crimes, including a 2001 rape, as the DNA
recovered from each crime scene matched.9 But for more than a decade,
investigators could not identify the perpetrator of those serious offenses;
that man’s DNA was not in the state or national forensic databases.10
After Virginia’s governor authorized familial searches, however, investiga-
tors got a break in the case. Though the culprit’s DNA was not in the
state database, the state’s forensic lab identified a partial DNA match—a
match that definitively excluded from suspicion the person whose DNA
provided the match, but implicated his close genetic relatives as possible
suspects.11 The match came from Kenneth Holloway, who had a criminal
record but had been out of prison for the last ten years.12 Police identi-
fied each of Kenneth’s close male relatives—his father and any brothers
or sons—as the possible perpetrator of the unsolved crimes. By process of
elimination, the police zeroed in on Kenneth’s younger brother, Tyrone,
who was by then living in South Carolina.13 After surreptitiously following
Tyrone, police tracked down a take-out bag Tyrone had discarded in a
public trashcan. DNA left on the contents of that bag finally matched the
unsolved crime-scene DNA.14 Tyrone was charged and convicted of the
2001 rape.15 Though Kenneth Holloway “understands that because he is
a felon, authorities have a right to his DNA should he ever reoffend,” he
nonetheless explained that “he feels it was wrong to use [his DNA] to go
after his brother.”16
These two events may seem far removed, but they are two sides of
the same genetic coin. Both the concerns voiced by the Lacks family and
the legal consequences for members of the Holloway family implicate the
same essential principles of genetic inheritance and genetic control.
7. Id.
8. Frank Green, Brother’s DNA Leads to Rape Conviction in Williamsburg, Richmond
Times-Dispatch (Feb. 22, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/crime/
brother-s-dna-leads-to-rape-conviction-in-williamsburg/article_90431ad3-5989-5122-b274-
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Individuals frequently provide their cells for genetic analysis, whether
knowingly or not (and whether voluntarily or not). When they do, they
are not the only ones whose identifiable genetic information they reveal.
Rather, those individuals’ close genetic relatives also have identifiable
genetic information at stake. Through the DNA of another, those rela-
tives may be targeted for criminal investigation (like Tyrone Holloway),
and their medical, behavioral, or other traits may be revealed or implied
(as concerned the Lacks family). In other words, genetic information
about one individual can be used to identify or learn about that individ-
ual’s close genetic relatives—with clinical, research, and criminal
consequences.
That is so because genetic information is inherited in specific and
predictable ways, such that close genetic relatives are more genetically
similar than unrelated individuals. An individual inherits 50% of her
genetic material from each parent and is expected to have roughly 50%
of her genes in common with any full sibling.17 In humans, that genetic
material is organized into twenty-three pairs of chromosomes. In each
generation, different portions of the DNA sequence in the chromosomes
from each parent are passed on to each child.18 As a result, each child is
unique, though she shares some parts of her sequence with her parents
and also with her siblings, who likewise inherited parental DNA—but in a
different combination.
The fact that identifiable genetic information is shared among close
genetic relatives is relevant in at least three distinct domains: forensic
familial identification, genetic research, and personal genetic testing. In
each of these arenas, certain individuals provide their cells for genetic
analysis, whether involuntarily (as in forensic identification and de-
identified genetic research) or voluntarily (as in nonanonymized
biomedical research and personal genetic testing). When they do, how-
ever, some identifiable genetic information of their close genetic relatives
is also revealed. But even as legal institutions have recognized that
individuals have some cognizable interest in what happens to their
identifiable genetic information,19 these legal actors have not accounted
for the interests close genetic relatives have in each other’s genetic infor-
17. Bruce R. Korf, Human Genetics and Genomics 36 (3d ed. 2007) (defining
Mendelian patterns of genetic inheritance).
18. See William Goodwin, Adrian Linacre & Sibte Hadi, An Introduction to Forensic
Genetics 11 (2d ed. 2011) (“Humans contain two sets of chromosomes—one version of
each chromosome from each parent . . . .”). Twenty-two of these pairs are autosomal,
meaning that they are inherited identically by both sexes. The last pair is the sex
chromosomes, in which human males inherit XY chromosomes, while human females
inherit XX. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich.
L. Rev. 291, 294 n.13 (2010).
19. See infra Part II (summarizing case law and statutes governing individual interests
in genetic material).
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mation, which contains some identifiable information for each
individual.
This state of affairs cannot persist. If identifiable genetic information
is worthy of protection, then legal institutions must take its inherently
shared nature seriously. Accounting for those shared interests in
identifiable genetic information is not straightforward, but it can be
done. And failing to act subverts the very legal interest at stake. Absent a
shift, individuals who have never been arrested—and whose DNA could
not lawfully be placed in a forensic DNA database directly—may
nonetheless be identified, surveiled, and arrested based on a partial DNA
match to a close genetic relative. That is precisely what happened in the
Holloway case. Similarly, individuals who consciously have declined to
participate in genetic research may have that choice effectively negated
by the participation of a parent, child, or sibling. That is one aspect of
the Lacks family’s concern about widespread access to and genetic
research involving Henrietta Lacks’s DNA. A legal interest in genetic
information impacts each of these domains.
This Article lays bare the shared nature of identifiable genetic infor-
mation and offers one account of how the law might approach that
shared nature, as typified in these three domains. In so doing, this Article
systematically identifies how DNA’s shared nature complicates the usual
individualistic rules that have characterized the law governing DNA.20
Genetic information is shared, and it is shared immutably and
nonvolitionally. Moreover, recognizing that efforts to account for the
shared nature of identifiable genetic information could draw on a num-
ber of legal frameworks and general principles, this Article focuses on
one of these: the law of property generally and the law of tenancy by the
entirety in particular. Like interests in shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation, tenancy by the entirety is grounded on unity of identity and on
family. Finally, the Article explores how the law of tenancy by the entirety
might help policymakers take proper account of the shared nature of
identifying genetic information in the three identified domains. While
tenancy by the entirety is not the only relevant analogy on which
policymakers may draw, its similar foundations, transformations, and fea-
tures render it an illuminating place to start.
I. THE BIOLOGY OF INHERITANCE
Some background about the biology of genetic similarity and
variability is necessary for an informed exploration of the ways in which
that biology is relevant in forensic identification, genetic research, and
personal genetic testing. Part I.A describes the basic biology. Part I.B
20. See infra Part III (discussing shortcomings of traditional privacy and property
approaches to interests in DNA, in light of overlapping and shared nature of those
interests).
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then provides a brief description of how each of the identified domains
uses genetic information.
A. Biological Structures of Genetic Information
Most of an individual’s genetic information is inherited in equal
parts from each parent’s DNA. The result is that, as set forth above,
individuals are 50% genetically identical to each parent and roughly 50%
genetically identical to each full sibling,21 though the mix of parental
DNA each child inherits will be distinct.22 In addition, a child inherits
some portions of DNA in full from just one parent. The Y chromosome is
only present in males, and it is inherited in full from father to each son.23
As a result, a Y-chromosome profile is not specific to an individual,
although it may identify a particular male line. Similarly, the small
amount of additional genetic material in mitochondria outside the
nucleus is inherited exclusively from the mother. 24 Therefore, all
individuals descended from the same mother will share the same (or
nearly identical) mitochondrial DNA sequence, and such sequences will
identify families, not individuals.25 To say that close genetic relatives
“share” genetic information is to recognize that some of the information
encoded in those relatives’ DNA is the same and that it springs from a
common source. The physical cells are distinct, but the informational
content is shared.
Of course, describing parents and children as 50% genetically identi-
cal is an oversimplification. After all, genetic information is composed of
just four different “chemical constituents,” or bases.26 These four bases
pair up in set patterns, and a “base pair” represents one “rung” in the
21. Korf, supra note 17, at 36. Mutation rates in humans are comparatively low, and
so “the vast majority of the differences . . . within an individual are inherited, rather than
resulting from de novo mutation.” T. Strachan & Andrew P. Read, Human Molecular
Genetics 316 (3d ed. 2004).
22. The exception, of course, is identical twins, who are expected to have identical
(or nearly identical) genetic sequences. See Daniel L. Hartl, Essential Genetics: A
Genomics Perspective 477 (6th ed. 2014) (noting identical twins are genetically identical
because they arise from splitting of single fertilized egg).
23. Edward S. Tobias, Michael Connor & Malcolm Ferguson Smith, Essential Medical
Genetics 61 (2011). Y-chromosome and other genetic sequences may display additional
variation among genetic relatives arising from mutation occurring during gamete
formation and subsequent cell division. See Strachan & Read, supra note 21, at 316
(discussing genetic mutations).
24. John M. Butler, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology, and Genetics of STR
Markers 247–49 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Butler, Forensic DNA Typing] (explaining
mitochondrial DNA is passed from original egg cell “directly to all offspring independent
of any male influence”).
25. Id. at 248–49.
26. Hartl, supra note 22, at 7 (listing adenine, guanine, thymine, and cytosine as four
bases).
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ladder-like form of DNA’s famous “double helix.”27 A human genome—
the total nuclear DNA sequence of an individual—contains roughly three
billion base pairs of DNA.28 Even unrelated individuals differ only by
hundredths of a percent at a genomic level.29 But while this may seem
like a very small difference, it in fact represents more than three million
base-pair differences between those unrelated individuals. 30 Closely
related individuals, meanwhile, will have fewer base-pair differences
between them. Thus, when we say that parents and children are 50%
genetically identical, we mean that children inherit roughly 50% of each
parent’s share of genetic variations.
The heritability of genetic variations has two consequences relevant
for purposes of this Article. First, patterns of relatedness and heritability
result in many fewer base-pair differences between two closely related
individuals than between two randomly selected strangers. Second, those
patterns make the portion of shared genetic variation more predictable,
with medical, research-related, and forensic implications.31
Even information about a single base pair can be revealing about an
individual and, in some instances, her close genetic relatives. A differ-
ence in a single base pair is known as a single nucleotide polymorphism
(SNP).32 While most SNPs do not have any known appreciable effect,
some can give rise to observed characteristics or increase the likelihood
of developing a particular trait.33 Sickle-cell anemia, for instance, is a
genetic disorder resulting from an SNP.34
27. Id. at 7–8.
28. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, Nat’l
Human Genome Res. Inst. (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.genome.gov/11006943 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part III (discussing shared nature of identifiable genetic information).
32. Benjamin Pierce, Genetics Essentials: Concepts and Connections 374 (2009).
33. Id.
34 . Tobias, Connor & Smith, supra note 23, at 152–53 (describing sickle-cell
inheritance). Sickle-cell anemia is a recessive genetic disorder, meaning that an individual
will only manifest the disorder if she inherits from both parents the gene variant, or allele,
linked to the disease. See Pierce, supra note 32, at 60 (defining recessive traits). In such
circumstances, both parents will necessarily have at least one copy of the disease-linked
variant, which he or she passed along to the child. Other genetic disorders associated with
SNPs are dominant, meaning that an individual will manifest the disorder even if she only
inherits a single copy of the disease-linked variant. See id. at 61 (defining dominant traits).
Dominant traits do not skip generations because, in nearly all cases, each person with a
dominant trait will have inherited it from at least one parent—who likewise would have
displayed that dominant trait. Id. In addition, there is a very small probability that a
particular SNP could arise by mutation, giving rise to a genetic disorder other than by
inheritance. See Strachan & Read, supra note 21, at 316 (explaining processes of genetic
mutation).
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Human genetic variation may also be found in stretches of DNA,
called “microsatellites.”35 At microsatellites, the genetic sequence “ap-
pears to ‘stutter,’ resulting in different numbers of copies of repeated
sequences” of base pairs.36 Forensic analysis currently examines varia-
tions in the lengths of these short tandem repeats (STRs) to construct
DNA profiles.37 STRs also can have medical implications.38 For instance,
Huntington’s disease, a dominantly inherited, degenerative neurological
disorder leading to dementia, is linked to an STR on chromosome four.39
These forms of genetic variation occur in both coding and noncod-
ing portions of the genome.40 Coding DNA contains the information
required to make proteins. 41 Conversely, noncoding DNA does not
encode for proteins and until recently was considered to have no
biological function.42 The great majority of human DNA is noncoding.43
The STRs that American forensics labs typically examine are located in
noncoding portions of the genome.44 Forensic genetics vests the distinc-
tion between coding and noncoding DNA with significance. Indeed,
some states explicitly prohibit forensic analysis that could predict genetic
35. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 248, 249 (2006).
36. Id.
37. Butler, Forensic DNA Typing, supra note 24, at 85–86; Greely et al., supra note
35, at 249–50.
38. See, e.g., Karen Usdin, The Biological Effects of Simple Tandem Repeats: Lesson
From the Repeat Expansion Diseases, 18 Genome Res. 1011, 1011 (2008) (observing
tandem repeats are “associate[ed] with human disease[s]” including Huntington’s disease,
spinobulbar muscular atrophy, myotonic dystrophy, and Fragile X syndrome); Tong Liang
et al., Detection of Dispersed Short Tandem Repeats Using Reversible Jump Markov Chain
Monte Carlo, Nucleic Acids Res. 1 (June 29, 2012), http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/
content/40/19/e147.full-text-lowres.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“There is
also an increasing amount of researches [sic] showing that tandem repeats are related to
many human diseases, such as Huntington’s disease and cancer.” (internal citations
omitted)).
39. Nat’l Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., Huntington Disease, Genes and Disease,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22226/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
40. Usdin, supra note 38, at 1011.
41. John M. Butler, Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing 25 (2009) [hereinafter
Butler, Fundamentals]. Proteins perform essential cell functions or serve as building
blocks for larger molecules. See Eldra Solomon, Linda Berg & Diana Martin, Biology 274
(10th ed. 2015) (explaining relationship between DNA, RNA, and proteins in basic
biology). Thus human variation, manifesting phenotypically as unique physical or medical
characteristics, derives from the small variations in the coding DNA contained in each
individual’s cells.
42. Butler, Fundamentals, supra note 41, at 25.
43. Id. Butler states that the portion of noncoding DNA in humans is roughly 95% of
the human genome. Id.
44. Id.
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disease or predisposition to illness.45 But new research casts doubt on the
notion that noncoding DNA is simply “junk.” Researchers have linked
genetic disorders to STRs in noncoding regions of genes, including cer-
tain neurodegenerative disorders and mental retardation syndromes.46
This suggests that the distinction between coding and noncoding DNA is
less rigid than previously believed.
B. Uses of Genetic Information
1. Forensic Identification. — Forensic DNA typing in the United States
typically analyzes STRs at thirteen genomic locations.47 Each location (or
“locus”; plural “loci”) reveals two alleles, or variants of repeat lengths,
one inherited from each genetic parent. Thus, twenty-six data points are
examined in all, and these constitute an individual’s genetic profile for
purposes of forensic investigation.
Local, state, and federal DNA laboratories may enter lawfully
obtained genetic profiles into a central database known as the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS).48 Today, all fifty states and a variety of fed-
eral agencies collect, store, and share genetic information through
CODIS.49 The genetic profiles of known felons, misdemeanants, and
arrestees are stored in CODIS’s “offender database,” while crime scene
DNA profiles are stored in a separate (“forensic”) CODIS index.50 A com-
plete match between an offender profile and a forensic profile is proba-
tive evidence that the matching offender committed the crime.
The CODIS software may also be used to search for less than exact
matches.51 Such searches may be necessary where a crime scene sample is
incomplete or degraded.52 But partial matches between an offender pro-
45. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.5-10(5) (2013) (forbidding use of DNA samples
for purposes of obtaining information about “physical characteristics, traits or
predispositions for disease”); Utah Code Ann. § 53-10-406(1)(f) (LexisNexis 2010)
(requiring bureau to “ensure that the DNA identification system does not provide
information allowing prediction of genetic disease or predisposition to illness”).
46. See Usdin, supra note 38, at 1012–13 (concluding many repeat-expansion
diseases “involve a repeat that is in a noncoding region of the gene” and providing
examples).
47 . Murphy, supra note 18, at 295 (describing process for uploading data to
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and data contained in CODIS profiles).
48. See id. at 296 (describing CODIS use by multiple jurisdictions).
49. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2012) (authorizing Director of FBI to “establish an
index of . . . DNA identification records of . . . persons convicted of crimes,” as well as
indices of “analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes,” “recovered from
unidentified human remains,” and “voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing
persons”).
51. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 297 (explaining low-stringency CODIS search
“returns matches in which at least one allele is present”).
52. See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale
Based on Familial DNA, 21 Hastings Women’s L.J. 3, 17–18 (2010) (“A partial match can
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file and a crime scene sample generated by such searches may exclude
the offender whose CODIS profile provides the match. This may occur
where, though matching in part, the known offender’s DNA profile also
is demonstrably different from the crime scene sample. These source-
excluding partial matches may instead inculpate the offender’s close
genetic relatives as possible perpetrators of a crime.53 Like the crime
scene sample, these relatives share some, but not all, of the examined
loci with the individual whose CODIS profile provided the partial match.
This is precisely what occurred in the investigations leading to
Tyrone Holloway’s arrest and conviction in Virginia. When the Virginia
state forensics laboratory identified a partial DNA match between
Kenneth Holloway’s DNA and the DNA collected from as-yet-unsolved
crime scenes, that match definitively excluded Kenneth as a suspect.54
Kenneth’s DNA matched the crime scene DNA only in part, and the por-
tions that did not match indicated that Kenneth did not commit the
crimes in question. But the match cast doubt on someone else—
Kenneth’s male relatives, and ultimately, on his brother Tyrone.55
Because DNA is inherited in established patterns, there is a strong
probability that close genetic relatives will share a significant number of
STR alleles. Two unrelated, randomly selected individuals will have, on
average, 8.59 alleles in common.56 By contrast, children will share at least
thirteen alleles with each parent.57 Siblings will share on average 16.5 to
17 alleles.58 Moreover, relatedness is more likely where two DNA samples
share rare genetic markers.59
occur . . . [when] running a degraded crime scene sample against the offender index . . . .
[T]he complete offender profile is identified as the possible source of the DNA . . . and
law enforcement will seek a fresh sample from that person.”).
53. See id. at 20–21 (providing example of “routine[]” familial searching in United
Kingdom).
54. Green, supra note 8 (“The laboratory made it clear that the person whose DNA
was in the database was eliminated as the suspect, but he could be the father, son or
brother of the perpetrator.”).
55. Id.
56. David R. Paoletti et al., Empirical Analysis of the STR Profiles Resulting from
Conceptual Mixtures, 50 J. Forensic Sci. 1361, 1364 (2005) (reporting hypothetical shared
allele counts among thirteen CODIS loci as 8.59 between random individuals, 10.95
between cousins, and 16.94 between siblings).
57. Murphy, supra note 18, at 295.
58. Paoletti et al., supra note 56, at 3; see also Greely et al., supra note 35, at 253
(reporting average of 16.7 alleles shared between full genetic siblings).
59. See Greely et al., supra note 35, at 252 (stating rare genotypes yield few CODIS
matches); Marjan Sjerps & Ate D. Kloosterman, On the Consequences of DNA Profile
Mismatches for Close Relatives of an Excluded Suspect, 112 Int’l J. Legal Med. 176, 176
(1999) (“[T]here can be situations in which the two non-matching DNA profiles suggest
that a close relative of the suspect might match the crime stain. This holds in particular for
cases in which the two non-matching DNA profiles share several very rare alleles.”).
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Under an “interim policy” instituted by the FBI in July 2006, states
now may share information about partial matches uncovered in CODIS.60
Today, most states have no formal policy in place regarding this prac-
tice.61 Yet at least nineteen states permit or have permitted the use of a
partial DNA match for purposes of familial investigation.62 At least one
state permits such use based solely on the similarity between crime scene
sample and offender CODIS profile alone, with no additional confirma-
tory genetic analysis required.63 This is so even though partial matching
methods presently have a significant rate of false positives—supposed
relatives who, upon further analysis, turn out not to be related.64
60. Combined DNA Index Sys., Bull. No. BT072006, Interim Plan for the Release of
Information in the Event of a “Partial Match” at NDIS (2006).
61. Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 751,
776 & fig.3 (2011) [hereinafter Ram, Fortuity].
62. Id. at 767.
63. See id. at 782 (reporting, in North Carolina, lab analysts may “informally discuss
partial matches with investigators,” and while “state laboratory handles Y-STR analysis, a
partial match would not constitute a trigger for such analysis. Mere similarity at a majority
of standard CODIS loci is sufficient”). Of course, most states that permit or have
permitted use of a source-excluding partial match attempt to confirm relatedness by
means of additional genetic testing, including analysis of STRs on the Y chromosome. See
id. (reporting at least twelve states “require additional genetic testing—usually Y-STR
analysis”).
64. See Frederick R. Bieber, Charles H. Brenner & David Lazer, Finding Criminals
Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 Science 1315, 1315 (2006) (finding, in 50,000
profile database, relative is top match about half of time and “has a 99% chance of
appearing among the 100 largest” likelihood ratios); James M. Curran & John S.
Buckleton, Effectiveness of Familial Searches, 84 Sci. & Just. 164, 166 (2008) (using allele
counting and likelihood ratio analysis methods and finding 72–78% probability true
sibling will be among top 100 matches); Thomas M. Reid et al., Use of Sibling Pairs to
Determine the Familial Searching Efficiency of Forensic Databases, 2 Forensic Sci. Int’l:
Genetics 340, 342 (2008) (concluding partial matching yields too many false positives to
be recommended at this time); Rori V. Rohlfs, Stephanie Malia Fullerton & Bruce S. Weir,
Familial Identification: Population Structure and Relationship Distinguishability, 8 PLoS
Genetics (Feb. 2012), at 1, 9, [hereinafter Rohlfs et al., Familial Identification] available at
http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pg
en.1002469&representation=PDF (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding
familial searching in structured populations “may result in law distinguishability and
potentially high false positive rates among certain groups”); Rori V. Rohlfs et al., The
Influence of Relatives on the Efficiency and Error Rate of Familial Searching, 8 PLOS
ONE (Aug. 2013), at 1, 7–8, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.
action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0070495&representation=PDF (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (concluding California familial search policy was likely to correctly
identify first-degree relative if one was already in database and was unlikely to return false
leads, but had high likelihood of falsely identifying more distant relative if one was in
database).
False positives in partial matching have already resulted in false identifications and
investigations. In March 2015, New Orleans filmmaker Michael Usry found himself the
target of a police investigation stemming from a partial match between DNA left at a 1996
murder scene and Usry’s father’s DNA, which was stored in a commercial DNA database
searched by forensic investigators. The partial match excluded Usry’s father as a suspect
but suggested a close relative might have committed the crime. Based on the partial
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2. Genetic Research. — More than 500 million specimens of human
biological material are stored in hundreds of biobanks throughout the
United States, and that number continues to grow by at least twenty
million per year.65 Genetic material may be used for research into how
the genome functions,66 as well as how genetic variations contribute or
give rise to medical conditions,67 behavioral differences,68 and even “‘re-
creational’”69 traits (like curly hair70 or a preference for cilantro71).
Advanced research methods, like those employed in whole-genome and
genome-wide research, raise new complications for legal and ethical
research standards. Whole-genome research involves sequencing the full
genome, followed by “various levels of data analysis, and, possibly, the use
match, police began to investigate Usry, eventually securing a warrant for Usry’s DNA.
Usry’s DNA was not a match for the crime scene DNA, exculpating Usry as a suspect. Jim
Mustian, New Orleans Filmmaker Cleared in Cold-Case Murder; False Positive Highlights
Limitations of Familial DNA Searching, New Orleans Advoc. (Mar. 12, 2015), http://
www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/11707192-123/new-orleans-filmmaker-cleared-in
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
65 . Mark A. Rothstein, Protecting Privacy in Genetic Research on Alcohol
Dependence and Other Addictions, in Genetic Research on Addiction 84, 84 (Audrey R.
Chapman ed., 2012); see also 1 Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, Research Involving
Human Biological Materials: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidance 13 (1999) (reporting “as
of 1998, more than 282 million specimens of human biological materials were stored in
the United States, accumulating at a rate of more than 20 million cases per year”).
66. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pennisi, DNA Study Forces Rethink of What It Means to Be a
Gene, 316 Science 1556, 1556 (2007) (reporting “pain-staking new analysis of 1% of the
human genome” found, contrary to conventional wisdom, genes “are neither compact nor
uniquely important” and “can be sprawling, with far-flung protein-coding and regulatory
regions that overlap with other genes”); Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic
Research, Nat’l Human Genome Res. Inst. (June 2, 2014), https://www.genome.gov/
19516792 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining “[g]enetic researchers are
now learning more about how each gene works and what it does”).
67. Nat’l Human Genome Res. Inst., supra note 66 (“[Genetic researchers] also study
the role that variations in genes play in disease.”).
68. See, e.g., Dean Hamer & Peter Copeland, The Science of Desire: The Search for
the Gay Gene and the Biology of Behavior 13–15 (1994) (introducing research on genetics
of sexual orientation); Marc D. Schwartz et al., Consent to the Use of Stored DNA for
Genetics Research: A Survey of Attitudes in the Jewish Population, 98 Am. J. Med. Genetics
336, 341 (2001) (finding “small, but statistically significant, reduction in willingness to
participate in studies involving homosexuality or frugality . . . both of which are potentially
stigmatizing”).
69. Eline M. Bunnik et al., Informed Consent in Direct-to-Consumer Personal
Genome Testing, 28 Bioethics 343, 344 (2012) [hereinafter Bunnik et al., Informed
Consent] (quoting J.P. Evans, Recreational Genomics: What’s in It for You?, 10 Genetic
Med. 709, 709–10 (2008)).
70 . Nicholas Eriksson et al., Web-Based, Participant-Driven Studies Yield Novel
Genetic Associations for Common Traits, 6 PLoS Genetics (June 2010), at 1, 8, available at
http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pg
en.1000993&representation=PDF (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
71. Nicholas Eriksson et al., A Genetic Variant Near Olfactory Receptor Genes
Influences Cilantro Preference (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1209.2096v1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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of the sample and/or data for a wide variety of future research pro-
jects.”72 Genome-wide association studies may examine thousands of
SNPs.73
[E]very time one of these genome-wide association studies is
conducted, the researcher theoretically has the opportunity to
look in each individual’s DNA not only for SNPs that correlate
with the disorder in which she is interested, but also for any
other SNPs that other investigators have identified as correlated
with other disorders.74
Traditionally, research specimens have been collected for one pur-
pose (like medical treatment) but subsequently used for another.75 Such
use has often occurred without consent from the tissue source, “either
because the [Institutional Review Board] waives that requirement or
because identifiers are removed so that the samples are no longer
deemed to involve ‘human subjects.’”76 American standards for legal and
ethical research require informed consent only from persons whose
“[i]dentifiable private information” is at issue. 77 Researchers have
attempted to avoid these stringent requirements by de-identifying or
anonymizing genetic information.78
72. Timothy Caulfield et al., Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome
Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLoS Biology (Mar. 2008), at 430, 431, available at
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbi
o.0060073&representation=PDF (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
73. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using
Archived DNA, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 286, 287–88 (2008) (discussing spread of chips that
can examine thousands of SNPs at once, enabling genome-wide association studies).
74. Id. at 288.
75. Id. at 287; see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480–83 (Cal.
1990) (discussing removal of patient’s spleen to combat hairy-cell leukemia and
subsequent use of spleen cells for commercial production of cell line to produce
lymphokines); Amy L. McGuire, Timothy Caulfield & Mildred K. Cho, Research Ethics
and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 Nature Revs. Genetics 152, 155
(2008) [hereinafter McGuire et al., Research Ethics] (discussing ethical difficulties and
recommendations regarding secondary use in context of whole-genome research).
76. Clayton, supra note 73, at 287 (citation omitted).
77. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2014) (defining “human subject” for purposes of
Common Rule, which governs research involving human subjects conducted using federal
monies, to include “living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or
student) conducting research obtains . . . [i]dentifiable private information”). The Common
Rule requires federally funded researchers to provide “human subjects” with extensive
information in the course of obtaining informed consent, including information about
the expected risks and benefits of the research and confidentiality procedures to be
followed. Id. § 46.116(a)(2)–(3), (5). The regulations go on to specify that protected
“[p]rivate information” is information that is “individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of
the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the
information).” Id. § 46.102(f). The FDA imposes similar requirements on all studies
submitted for its review in 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 812 (2012).
78. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (enumerating eighteen identifiers, removal of
which renders what would otherwise be protected health information “de-identifi[ed]”
and outside scope of Privacy Rule of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
886 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:873
Direct-to-consumer companies offering genetic analysis for personal
and research uses, such as 23andMe, similarly distinguish the research
use of “individual-level information” from research involving only
“anonymized and aggregate information,” which 23andMe shares more
freely with third parties. 79 23andMe defines “individual-level infor-
mation” as “information about a single individual’s genotypes, diseases or
other traits/characteristics” and attempts to distinguish this from the
“anonymized and aggregate information,” which is, principally, “any
information that has been stripped of your name and contact infor-
mation and aggregated with information of others.”80 In January 2015,
23andMe announced high-profile data sharing arrangements through
which several pharmaceutical companies will gain access to the full
genetic profiles of thousands—and in some instances, hundreds of thou-
sands—of 23andMe’s customers.81
Yet a number of recent studies have demonstrated that such
“anonymization” may not be as sound as previously believed.82 In one
demonstration, researchers showed that “an individual can be uniquely
identified with access to just 75 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
from that person,” while “[g]enomewide association studies routinely use
more than 100,000 SNPs to genotype individuals.”83 Re-identification is
(HIPAA)); Office of Human Research Prots., Guidance on Research Involving Coded
Private Information or Biological Specimens, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct.
16, 2008), www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reaffirming review and consent obligations ordinarily applicable to federally funded
research do not apply to research using biological specimens that are not “individually
identifiable”).
79. Privacy Highlights, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
80. Id.
81. See Press Release, 23andMe and Genentech to Analyze Genomic Data for
Parkinson’s Disease, 23andMeMedia (Jan. 6, 2015), http://mediacenter.23andme.com/
blog/2015/01/06/23andme-genentech-pd/ [hereinafter 23andMe, Genentech Press
Release] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing “multi-year collaboration”
with Genentech based on 23andMe’s “Parkinson disease community”); Press Release,
23andMe Announces Collaboration with Pfizer Inc. to Conduct Genetic Research
Through 23andMe’s Research Platform, 23andMeMedia (Jan. 12, 2015), http://
mediacenter.23andme.com/blog/2015/01/12/23andme-pfizer-research-platform/
[hereinafter 23andMe, Pfizer Press Release] (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(detailing agreement providing Pfizer researchers with access to “genotyped population of
over 800,000 individuals”).
82. See Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 9 Nature
Revs. Genetics 406, 406 (2008) (“Developments in both medical informatics and
bioinformatics show that the guarantee of absolute privacy and confidentiality is not a
promise that medical and scientific researchers can deliver any longer.”); Robert Mitchell
et al., Genomics, Biobanks, and the Trade-Secret Model, 332 Science 309, 309 (2011)
(“Although traditional research promised confidentiality and/or anonymity to
participants, advances in DNA technology may render these safeguards meaningless.”
(internal citation omitted)).
83. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 Science 370,
370 (2006); see also Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
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possible even from pooled or aggregated DNA data. 84 Individual
informed consent to genome-wide or whole-genome research may there-
fore be necessary.
Where re-identification occurs, it often yields information about
both the specific individual from whom the genetic material came and
her close genetic relatives.85 Generating “whole-genome data significantly
increases the ability to match the DNA of close relatives, and to reveal
predictive information about relatives’ present and future health risks.”86
When the Lacks family expressed concerns about researchers
compromising their genetic interests through research on HeLa cells,
the familial consequences of large-scale genetic research are what they
had in mind.87 Some in the bioethics community are already sorting out
whether, even outside of a special case like that involving HeLa cells,
Inference, 339 Science 321, 321 (2013) (“[W]e report that surnames can be recovered
from personal genomes by profiling short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome (Y-STRs)
and querying recreational genetic genealogy databases.”). See generally Angela L.
Morrison, Note, A Research Revolution: Genetic Testing Consumers Become Research
(and Privacy) Guinea Pigs, 9 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 573, 590–91 (2011)
(identifying studies demonstrating that anonymity cannot be preserved simply by “re-
moving certain pieces of information from data” drawn from individuals).
84. See Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA
to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PLoS
Genetics (Aug. 2008), at 1, 2–6, available at http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/
fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167&representation=PDF (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining methodology of study showing possibility of
extracting information from pooled DNA); see also P3G Consortium et al., Public Access
to Genome-Wide Data: Five Views on Balancing Research with Privacy and Protection, 5
PLoS Genetics (Oct. 2009), at 1, 1, available at http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/
fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pgen.1000665&representation=PDF (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Homer et al. as demonstrating, “given
genome-wide genotype data from an individual, it is, in principle, possible to ascertain
whether that individual is a member of a larger group defined solely by aggregate
genotype frequencies”).
85. See, e.g., Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 1867, 1867–68
(2002) (identifying range of medical conditions for which genetic analysis currently is
available and observing “[a] genetic diagnosis often indicates that other family members
are at risk for the same condition”); Kathy Hudson, The Human Genome Project, DNA
Science and the Law: The American Legal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic
Science, 51 Am. U. L. Rev. 431, 445 (2002) (“[M]y DNA is not just my DNA. It’s my
family’s DNA. It’s related to my sons. It’s related to my mom. It’s related to my sister . . . .
There’s a National Human Subjects Research Protection Advisory Committee who is
struggling with . . . whether third parties constitute human subjects.”).
86. McGuire et al., Research Ethics, supra note 75, at 154; see also Eline M. Bunnik et
al., The New Genetics and Informed Consent: Differentiating Choice To Preserve
Autonomy, 27 Bioethics 348, 350 (2013) [hereinafter Bunnik et al., New Genetics]
(“[W]hole-genome tests routinely reveal such findings.”); Burke, supra note 85, at 1867–68
(noting genetic diagnosis for one individual “often indicates that other family members
are at risk for the same condition”).
87. See Caplan, supra note 5 (noting Lacks’s family members were “concerned that
personal medical information about their family could be deduced by anyone who had the
full genome map in their possession”).
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these close relatives also have a role to play in the informed consent
process.88
3. Personal Genetic Testing. — Genetic analysis for personal use typi-
cally falls into one of two domains: ancestral and medical. Several
commercial firms market ancestral genetic analysis directly to consum-
ers.89 This analysis is designed to enable consumers to “[f]ind relatives
across continents or across the street.”90 As one such service advertises,
“[t]he matches you’ll get can range from close family to distant cous-
ins”—some of whom may be previously unknown.91
Medical genetic analysis typically may be obtained through a physi-
cian. Falling costs and improving sequencing technology have rapidly
88. See, e.g., Bunnik et al., New Genetics, supra note 86, at 351 (discussing ethical
issues arising from prenatal screening, such as respecting autonomy of future child);
Caulfield et al., supra note 72, at 434 (suggesting release of genomic data into restricted-
access databases to enhance privacy protection); Lunshof et al., supra note 82, at 410
(“The genetic and medical information that is posted on [a] study website . . . could also
have relevance to participants’ family members. Individuals could be traced and identified
by any DNA-containing sample from their relatives who might not even be aware of its
storage and its possible implications.”); McGuire et al., Research Ethics, supra note 75, at
154 (observing “[a]s the risks to relatives increase, the ethical obligations towards them
intensify” but concluding, for now, “additional informed consent from close genetic
relatives should not be required”); Bahrad A. Sokhansanj, Note, Beyond Protecting
Genetic Privacy: Understanding Genetic Discrimination Through Its Disparate Impact on
Racial Minorities, 2 Colum. J. Race & L. 279, 302 (2012) (discussing proposals for
increased rigor in consent procedures used in genetic studies); infra notes 335–338 and
accompanying text (discussing consensus among bioethicists that obligations to close
relatives of genomic-sequencing subjects increase as risks to them increase).
89. Morrison, supra note 83, at 579 (discussing various kinds of direct-to-consumer
genetic testing). Although the profile of direct-to-consumer genetic testing has risen, the
number of competitors in this market has fallen. Of the three most prominent
companies—23andMe, Navigenics, and DeCodeMe—one (Navigenics) was acquired in
2012 by another company that does not appear to provide testing directly to consumers
and another (DeCodeMe) has stopped providing direct-to-consumer testing itself. See
Andrew Pollack, Consumers Slow to Embrace the Age of Genomics, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/business/20consumergene.html?_r=0 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting 23andMe was “most prominent of a trio of
companies that in 2007 began using the Web to market personal genomics services” and
other two competitors had moved away from direct-to-consumer personal testing);
Acquisition FAQs, Navigenics, https://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about_us/acquisition
_faqs/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (discussing
Navigenics’s acquisition by Life Technologies in August 2012). Accordingly, this Article’s
discussion of personal genetic testing relies primarily on the services that 23andMe has
offered and continues to offer directly to consumers.
90. Ancestry, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/ancestry/ [hereinafter Ancestry,
23andMe] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
91. Id.; see also Trevor Woodage, Note, Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy
Protection Because of the Inability to Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Information by
Relatives, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 682, 703 & n.137 (2010) (discussing 23andMe’s similar Relative
Finder service).
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expanded the scope of such genetic analysis available to individuals.92
Building on existing genetic research, clinical tests are available to screen
for a variety of medical diseases and disorders, including genes linked to
Alzheimer’s disease, bipolar disorder, breast cancer, coronary heart dis-
ease, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and pancreatic cancer.93
In addition, direct-to-consumer companies previously offered a
range of genetic services screening for a wide range of medical94 and
nonmedical markers.95 Indeed, “[f]or a few hundred dollars,” direct-to-
consumer services provided consumers with “‘personal genome tests’ that
map hundreds of thousands of genetic variants across the genome and
estimate disease risks for dozens of diseases and other phenotypic
traits.”96 In November 2013, however, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) ordered the most prominent of these services—23andMe, Inc.—
to stop marketing genetic tests “intended for use in the diagnosis of dis-
ease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or preven-
tion of disease, or . . . intended to affect the structure or function of the
body.”97 The FDA concluded that many of 23andMe’s tests and services
constituted a medical device and that 23andMe had not assured the
agency “that the firm has analytically or clinically validated the [personal
genome service] for its intended uses.”98 Today, 23andMe offers only
“ancestry-related genetic reports and uninterpreted raw genetic data.”99
The company, however, recently received FDA approval for its first
92. Avak Kahvejian, John Quackenbush & John F. Thompson, What Would You Do If
You Could Sequence Everything?, 26 Nature Biotechnology 1125, 1125 (2008) (discussing
implications of falling costs and improving sequencing technology).
93. See Genetic Testing Registry, Nat’l Ctr. for Biotech. Info., http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/gtr/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 23, 2015) (providing
searchable database for clinical tests available to screen for diseases and disorders). To see
the clinical tests available for a specific disease, search for the medical condition under
“Conditions/Phenotypes” and view “Clinical tests” for each disorder. Id.
94. See Bunnik et al., Informed Consent, supra note 69, at 347 (identifying direct-to-
consumer screening for “complex diseases” including “type 2 diabetes, osteoporosis,
cardio-vascular diseases or schizophrenia,” as well as for “some pharmacogenomic markers
and carrier screening for monogenic diseases”).
95. See, e.g., id. (listing tests including “alcohol flush reaction, freckling, memory or
muscle performance”).
96. Bunnik et al., New Genetics, supra note 86, at 352.
97. Warning Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In vitro Diagnostics &
Radiological Health, Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, Food & Drug Admin., to
Ann Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforce
mentActions/WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm [hereinafter Warning Letter] (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
98. Id.
99. 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
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diagnostic test and has committed to working with the FDA to obtain
clearance for other medical genetic tests.100
Each of these sources of personal genetic information requires only
the authorization of the individual whose cells are used for analysis.101
Yet, the information disclosed through this testing may be significant for
that individual’s close genetic relatives. Genes for medical traits, if pre-
sent in a child, disclose that at least one parent similarly carries the gene
in question because, as mentioned above, children inherit half of their
genetic material from each parent.102 Moreover, if a parent or sibling car-
ries a particular gene variant, then that indicates an increased probability
that the variant is also present in another family member.103 And where
facilitating identification of genetic relatives is the aim of genetic analysis,
the interests of those relatives—both known and unknown—are impli-
cated. Such analysis can reveal heretofore-unknown or -unrevealed
infidelity, disrupting existing familial relationships and forging new
ones.104
100. See Anne Wojcicki, A Note to Our Customers Regarding the FDA, 23andMe
(Feb. 19, 2015), http://blog.23andme.com/news/a-note-to-our-customers-regarding-the-
fda/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing FDA’s approval of genetic test for
Bloom syndrome and explaining “[w]e will continue to work with the FDA to ensure that
all future health submissions meet the agency’s standards”). For now, 23andMe will
continue to provide new customers with only “ancestry-related information and uninter-
preted raw genetic data.” About Genetic Data & Health Reports, 23andMe, https://www.
23andme.com/health/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
101. See, e.g., How It Works, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/
[hereinafter How It Works, 23andMe] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Mar. 24, 2015) (explaining individual seeking genetic analysis must order DNA kit and
“register your specific bar code number” prior to submitting saliva sample). The terms
governing this genetic analysis are embodied in the Terms of Service, and participation in
23andMe Research also requires completion of a “Consent Document.” See Terms of
Service, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). Whether the authorization sought for direct-to-
consumer genetic testing should conform to informed consent requirements remains an
open question. See Bunnik et al., Informed Consent, supra note 69, at 348–49 (arguing
traditional approaches to informed consent fail in context of personal genome testing).
102. Korf, supra note 17, at 36.
103. See Burke, supra note 85, at 1867–68 (“A genetic diagnosis often indicates that
other family members are at risk for the same condition.”); Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose
Genes Are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic Information, 91 Mich.
L. Rev. 1854, 1861 (1993) (“Therefore, whenever a disease gene is detected, there is a
good probability that some siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, or other relatives may also carry
the gene, particularly if it is recessive and lies unexpressed for many generations.”).
104. See Daniel Engber, Who’s Your Daddy? The Perils of Personal Genomics, Slate
(May 21, 2013, 5:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/
2013/05/paternity_testing_personal_genomics_companies_will_reveal_dna_secrets.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting woman’s discovery of nonpaternity
using 23andMe genetic testing); Kashmir Hill, Whoops. How DNA Site 23andMe Outed
Parents Who Gave Their Baby up for Adoption, Forbes (May 16, 2012, 12:48 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/05/16/dna-site-23andme-outed-parents-
who-gave-their-first-baby-up-for-adoption/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
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II. THE LEGAL INTEREST IN IDENTIFIABLE GENETIC INFORMATION
A necessary predicate to considering how the law ought to take into
account the shared nature of identifiable genetic information is that
there first be a cognizable interest in controlling identifiable genetic
information at all. This initial question must be answered in the affirma-
tive in order for the question about a collateral interest in the genetic
information of close genetic relatives to be relevant. This antecedent
question has not been free from doubt. In the research context, courts
often have demonstrated little concern for whatever legal interest
individuals may assert in their physical cells.105 And in the forensic arena,
scholars often have maintained that, for better or worse, the Constitution
regulates the government’s initial collection, but not subsequent analysis,
of evidence.106
(discussing discovery of full genetic siblings using 23andMe, where one sibling had been
placed for adoption and his existence had been previously unknown to other sibling); see
also What Can 23andMe Do for Me If I Am Adopted?, 23andMe, https://customercare.
23andme.com/entries/21734228-What-can-23andMe-do-for-me-if-I-am-adopted-
[hereinafter 23andMe, If I Am Adopted] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Mar. 24, 2015) (“There is . . . the possibility of finding a much closer relative—
including a parent or sibling.”).
105. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990)
(holding undisclosed use of cells in medical research does not constitute conversion); see
also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing Washington
University as exclusive owner of tissues provided by patients seeing urological specialist at
University); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing conversion claim for unauthorized use of tissue
samples). Both Catalona and Greenberg emphasized that the tissues at issue were donated.
Catalona, 490 F.3d at 676 (concluding research participants “donated their biological
materials to [Washington University] as valid inter vivos gifts”); Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d
at 1074 (finding individuals providing tissue samples for research on Canavan disease
made “donations to research without any contemporaneous expectations of return of the
body tissue and genetic samples, and thus conversion does not lie as a cause of action”).
These cases suggest that individuals may have a property interest to assert in their cells but
that any such interest was waived or gifted away in these cases.
Moreover, even Moore did not hold that human biological material could never be the
subject of personal property rights. See 793 P.2d at 491–92 (describing California law as
limiting individual property rights over excised cells but acknowledging “some limited
right to control the use of excised cells” may remain). Indeed, only a few years after Moore,
the California Court of Appeals held that a sperm donor may have a property-like interest
in his stored semen. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 1993)
(explaining donor’s right was not “governed by the general law of personal property” but
was “an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision making
authority as to the sperm within the scope of the policy set by law”); see also Natalie
Logan, Note, Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and
Continued Seizure Under the DNA Act, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 733, 753 (2012) (discussing Moore
and Hecht).
106. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich.
L. Rev. 311, 331–32 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment law traditionally has focused only on the
first step [of surveillance regimes]—the acquisition of information. The subsequent
analysis and use of information has been considered beyond the scope of Fourth
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But genetic information is different. Courts, regulators, and legisla-
tures—as well as ordinary citizens—have indicated that genetic infor-
mation is something over which one ought to have some measure of
control, at least where that information can be traced back to an
individual.107 In other words, lawmaking institutions have recognized that
people do have a cognizable legal interest in their identifiable genetic
information.
To be sure, existing legal rules and doctrines addressing genetic
information have largely considered only the interest an individual has in
identifiable genetic information drawn from her own cells. While those
accounts are underinclusive for the reasons set forth in Part III, claims to
the genetic information in one’s own cells provide a basis for considering
interests in identifiable genetic information more broadly.
Identifiable genetic information may be analyzed through multiple
legal lenses, as implicating interests in property,108 privacy,109 confidential-
ity, 110 dignity, 111 comparative justice, 112 and family cohesion, 113 among
Amendment protection.” (internal citations omitted)); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data
Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 285, 315 (2011) (“Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has focused on the gathering of information as opposed to its subsequent
analysis.”).
107. See infra notes 114–138 and accompanying text (providing examples of articles,
cases, and statutes supporting individual’s right to control her genetic information).
108 . See infra notes 193–198 and accompanying text (discussing judicial and
legislative interpretations of genetic information as property of individual to whom
information pertains).
109. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 313–19 (examining privacy implications of
familial searches of DNA databases); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property:
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 737, 773–74
(2004) (arguing personhood conception of privacy applies to protecting genetic
information).
110. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (weighing patient’s right in
medical confidentiality against physician’s duty to warn patient’s family members about
genetic risk and holding any such duty “will be satisfied by warning the patient”); Safer v.
Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (weighing patient’s
right in medical confidentiality against physician’s duty to warn patient’s family members
about genetic risk and declining “to hold . . . that, in all circumstances, the duty to warn
will be satisfied by informing the patient”). On the distinction between privacy and
confidentiality, see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 127 (2007) (arguing “divergent paths of
privacy and confidentiality law [exist] in America and England”).
111. See, e.g., Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 119,
125 (2009) [hereinafter Ram, Assigning Rights] (“Respect for the interests of tissue
providers in controlling the ways in which their tissues, and the information contained in
their cells, are used flows in part from respect for human dignity.”).
112. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of
“Familial Searching,” 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 109, 163 (2013) (questioning whether
widespread partial match reporting and investigation would “purchase greater individual
justice at the expense of comparative justice (because of racially skewed databases and the
bad luck that the close kin of database inhabitants suffer through no fault of their own)”
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others. Two legal lenses have proven most significant in assessing claims
touching on identifiable genetic information: privacy and property.
Ordinary citizens manifest a desire to control what is done with their
identifiable genetic information, framed in both property and privacy
terms. For instance, research on public attitudes regarding consent to
the research use of genetic material reveals that, while most potential
research participants are happy to grant broad consent for future use of
their genetic information, a large majority also believe that their consent
should be required before researchers can use clinically derived samples
retaining personal identifiers.114 “Personal control over [one’s genetic
information] is central to individual autonomy in making basic life
decisions.”115 This notion of control—and control most basically about
excluding others from accessing one’s information—invokes the framing
of property, and its core right to exclude. Similarly sounding a property
theme are the medical rights to know and not to know: In the medical
context, individuals retain both a right to know what their genetic infor-
mation reveals about them and the right not to know certain genetic
information.116
Yet, citizens also express privacy-related concerns about their genetic
information. In the context of genome-wide research, one study reported
that “84% of participants chose public data release, with anonymization,
prior to learning about re-identification risks. After receiving such educa-
tion, only 53% chose public release, 33% chose restricted access in a
(footnote omitted)); Daniel J. Grimm, Note, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance:
Familial DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1164, 1175–85
(2007) (arguing impact of partial matching may be greater for Hispanics than for other
ethnic populations because individuals in Hispanic community tend to have larger family
structures).
113. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 319–21 (discussing impact of forensic
familial identification and investigation on “societal interest in intact families”).
114. See Dave Wendler & Ezekiel Emanuel, The Debate over Research on Stored
Biological Samples, 162 Archives Internal Med. 1457, 1459–60 (2002) (reporting survey
results and finding two-thirds of respondents believe consent should be required for
research using clinically derived samples retaining personal identifiers). Moreover, one
out of eight respondents indicated that they believed consent should be required even for
additional research using research-derived samples that have been stripped of personally
identifying information. Id. at 1460.
115. Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic
Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 665, 679 (2011) [hereinafter Joh, DNA Theft].
116. See Bunnik et al., New Genetics, supra note 86, at 349 (“The testee has a right
to know, but also a right not to know genetic information.”); Caulfield et al., supra note 72,
at 433 (recommending personal genome research projects should “acknowledge the
participants’ right not to know certain results”); Bert-Jaap Koops & Maurice Schellekens,
Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Regulatory Issues, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 158, 175
(2008) (“The right not to know is uniformly recognized as an important principle.”). See
generally The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know: Genetic Privacy and
Responsibility (Ruth Chadwick, Mairi Levit & Darren Shickle eds., 2d ed. 2014) (collecting
works analyzing privacy-related topics in field of genetic research).
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password-protected database, and 14% opted out of data sharing.”117
These findings underscore that the identifiability of genetic infor-
mation—the possibility of attributing certain genetic information to a
particular individual—matters to a significant portion of the population.
In the language of privacy and disclosure, experts warn that “[i]n theory,
whole genome sequence information could be used to deny financial
backing or loan approval, educational opportunities, sports eligibility,
military accession, or adoption eligibility. Disclosing genomic infor-
mation could affect the opportunities available to individuals, subject
them to social stigma, and cause psychological harm.”118
Policymakers across legal institutions have utilized the same two
frames, property and privacy, in attempting to operationalize this interest
in controlling one’s identifiable genetic information. This not only
underscores the centrality of the property and privacy frames, but also
indicates that the interest in identifiable genetic information is one soci-
ety is prepared to take seriously. Most directly, a number of states have
enacted legislation declaring that genetic information is the property of
the individual from whom it derives.119 Congress, in turn, has legislated
genetic information through privacy protections. The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) demonstrates Congress’s
understanding of the importance of genetic information. GINA aims to
protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of genetic infor-
mation in the employment and health insurance markets.120 Its express
intent is to “protect the public from discrimination and allay their con-
cerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals
to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new
117. Sokhansanj, supra note 88, at 303 (discussing Amy L. McGuire et al., To Share
or Not to Share: A Randomized Trial of Consent for Data Sharing in Genome Research, 13
Genetics Med. 948, 952 (2011)).
118. Presidential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Privacy and Progress in
Whole Genome Sequencing 24–25 (Oct. 2012) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Privacy
and Progress], available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
119. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2014) (“Genetic
information is the unique property of the individual to whom the information
pertains . . . .”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2010) (declaring results of genetic
testing “exclusive property of the person tested”); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-54-1(1) (2013)
(“Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested . . . .”); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22:1023(E) (2014) (“An insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information is the property
of the insured or enrollee.”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 192.537(1) (2013) (“[A]n individual’s genetic
information and DNA sample are private and must be protected, and an individual has a
right to the protection of that privacy.”). This list of statutes and the accompanying
descriptions were first compiled in Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 868 n.61 (2006)
[hereinafter Joh, Reclaiming].
120. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881.
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therapies.”121 Significantly, GINA defines “genetic information” to in-
clude not only an individual’s own genetic tests, but also the tests of
genetic relatives.122 GINA clarifies that “genetic information” is “health
information” under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA).123
HIPAA, in turn, emphasizes the need for control where “individually
identifiable” information is at issue.124 The Privacy Rule promulgated
under HIPAA generally requires that a covered entity obtain authoriza-
tion from an individual for the disclosure or research use of her pro-
tected health information (including individually identifiable genetic
information), unless a regulatory exception applies.125 These disclosure
restrictions, however, are inapplicable to health information that has
been de-identified, which the regulations exclude from the definition of
“protected health information.”126 Other federal regulations governing
research similarly condition protection on “[i]dentifiable private infor-
mation.”127 The regulations make clear that the identifiability of infor-
mation is crucial for legal protection. Once again, however, repeated
demonstrations of re-identification of genetic information raise doubts
that such information can truly be said to be “de-identified.”128
121. Id. § 2(5), 122 Stat. at 882–83 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16) (2012) (defining “Genetic Information”); see
also id. § 1320d-9(b)(1) (incorporating this definition by reference); infra text
accompanying notes 245–246 (discussing GINA’s definition of genetic relatedness).
123. Id. § 1320d-9(a)(1).
124. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2014) (specifying HIPAA’s disclosure restrictions
apply only to “individually identifiable” information).
125 . Id. § 164.512(i) (setting forth regulatory exceptions to rule of required
authorization).
126 . See id. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a) (“Health information that does not
identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that
the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable health
information.”). The Privacy Rule also permits protected health information to be disclosed
without authorization in some instances, including for research purposes. Id. § 164.514(e)
(specifying protected health information may be disclosed for, inter alia, research
purposes, so long as information released contains only limited data set and is released
pursuant to data use agreement between researcher and covered entity (but not individual
whose information is at issue)).
127. See id. § 46.102(f) (setting forth Department of Health and Human Services
policy on protection of identifiable private information); see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text (noting American legal and ethical standards require informed
consent only when identifiable personal information is at stake).
128. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (questioning soundness of
“anonymization” procedures). The Privacy Rule permits de-identification to be
accomplished by removing eighteen categories of information, but only if “[t]he covered
entity does not have actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in
combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the
information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). Alternatively, de-identification may be found
where “the risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination
with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify an
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Moreover, the Supreme Court recently recognized that the analysis
of identifiable genetic information, and not only its collection, calls for
constitutional scrutiny—and thus that identifiable genetic information is
information in which individuals may have a legitimate expectation of
privacy. In Maryland v. King, the Court considered the analysis of a com-
pelled genetic sample to be a separate Fourth Amendment event from
the acquisition of the sample itself.129 The Court concluded that neither
collection nor analysis is impermissible under the Fourth Amendment
where an individual has been validly arrested for a serious offense.130 But
it is significant that the Court considered the genetic analysis inde-
pendently, as it implies that genetic analysis itself implicates a privacy
interest of constitutional magnitude.131 Such interests, the Court has
repeatedly explained, are ones that involve an “expectation of privacy . . .
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”132 In other words,
King implies that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their identifiable genetic information that is distinct from their interest
in the physical cells. The privacy interest in that information will not
necessarily prevent the government or other actors from making use of
genetic information without authorization; indeed, King held just the
opposite. But the existence of that interest demands more searching
scrutiny where unauthorized or compelled genetic analysis is at issue. In
King, the Court found the diminished expectation of privacy that
arrestees retain to be critical to its holding that compelled DNA collec-
tion and analysis passes constitutional muster.133
individual who is a subject of the information.” Id. § 164.514(b)(1). Re-identification
demonstrations indicate that neither assurance may be available where large swaths of
genetic information are at issue.
129. See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (noting analysis may present additional
privacy concerns).
130. See id. at 1980 (“When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to
hold for a serious offense . . . taking and analyzing . . . the arrestee’s DNA is . . . reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”).
131. See id. at 1979 (considering whether “processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s
13 CODIS loci” intruded “on respondent’s privacy in a way that would make his DNA
identification unconstitutional”). Some courts of appeals have similarly discussed genetic
analysis as a “search” separate from the collection of genetic material. See, e.g., United
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing “processing of the DNA
sample and creation of the DNA profile for CODIS” is search with “potential to infringe
upon privacy interests”); United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007)
(reiterating “‘analysis and maintenance of [offenders’] information’ in CODIS, the federal
database is, in itself, a significant intrusion,” which constitutes “a second and potentially
much more serious invasion of privacy” (alteration in original) (quoting Nicholas v.
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005))); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182
(3d Cir. 2005) (“‘The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data’
is also a search covered by the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989))).
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. 133 S. Ct. at 1978–80 (“[U]nlike the search of a citizen who has not been
suspected of wrong, a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.”).
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At a minimum, King strongly suggests that there is a constitutionally
relevant interest in identifiable, medically relevant genetic information.
The Court emphasized that “the CODIS loci come from noncoding parts
of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee.”134 The
Court also deemed the collection and analysis of genetic information
analogous to the collection and analysis of fingerprints.135 And the Court
warned that analysis going beyond identification and “determin[ing], for
instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other
hereditary factors not relevant to identity . . . would present additional
privacy concerns not present here.”136 Like the separate discussion of
DNA analysis generally, the Court’s comments in this regard imply that
information analysis implicates constitutional concerns. And the Court
recognized a line between “junk” and more private information that ech-
oes nearly every appellate court decision assessing the constitutionality of
various aspects of forensic identification.137 Thus, the government’s use
of genetic information for more than merely fingerprint-like identifica-
tion of the individual whose cells are involved likely implicates weightier
interests not addressed thus far.138
In sum, policymakers, courts, and ordinary citizens agree: Enabling
individuals to control the dissemination of their identifiable genetic
information—whether in the language of privacy or property—is worthy
of pursuit.
134. Id. at 1979. But see Usdin, supra note 38, at 1012–13 (identifying genetic
diseases involving “noncoding region of the gene”).
135. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (“[T]he only difference between DNA analysis and
the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.”).
136. Id. at 1979.
137. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing with
“every one of our sister circuits” that concerns about “scope of information that can be
obtained from a DNA sample” are unpersuasive “given their speculative nature and the
safeguards attendant to DNA collection and analysis” (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (reiterating
“government may extract junk DNA from samples, and use it to generate profiles for
inclusion in CODIS, because present scientific understanding indicates that junk DNA
reveals no sensitive, private genetic or medical information”); United States v. Weikert, 504
F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Profiling . . . [uses] only so-called ‘junk DNA,’” which “differs
from one individual to the next and . . . can be used for . . . identification but which was
‘purposely selected because [it is] not associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics’ and ‘do[es] not control or influence the expression of any trait.’” (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000))); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir.
2005) (“The junk DNA that is extracted has, at present, no known function, except to
accurately and uniquely establish identity.”).
138. Cf. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding partial
matching for familial investigation remains “speculative” but acknowledging “[a]rguably,
the government’s use of CODIS to discover partial matches could raise privacy concerns
not raised by a traditional fingerprint database”).
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III. DNA IS SHARED, IMMUTABLY AND INVOLUNTARILY
Although individuals have a cognizable interest in controlling their
identifiable genetic information, existing rules governing the dissemina-
tion and use of this information are inadequate to protect the full range
of this interest. As King demonstrates, forensic genetic profiles have been
likened to fingerprints.139 Courts also have approved both research and
forensic uses of genetic information based on an individual’s supposed
abandonment of that information.140 Even state statutes that recognize
that an individual has a property right in her genetic information
ordinarily limit that right to the genetic information in her own cells.141
More broadly, the most commonly deployed legal protections for
genetic information—privacy and property—often are individualistic in
scope. Privacy and its associated rights are frequently thought of as uni-
tary in nature; namely, as rights of the individual “against the world.”142
As one commentator has observed, American privacy law is “structured
over a strictly individualistic concept of private information.”143 Con-
sistent with that approach, doctrines of informed consent are “meant to
respect individual autonomy.”144
With respect to property, Blackstone described that right as “that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”145 The Supreme Court similarly has recog-
nized that the right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”146 Con-
sistent with that approach, property theory presently applied to identifia-
ble genetic information has treated that information atomistically.147
139. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (comparing use of forensic genetic profiles to
matching suspect’s fingerprints to fingerprint evidence deriving from scene of crime).
140. See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ application
of doctrine of abandonment to permit DNA use in research and forensic contexts).
141. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2010) (declaring results of genetic
testing “exclusive property of the person tested”); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-54-1(1) (2013)
(“Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested.”).
142. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 213 (1890).
143. Laura Maria Franciosi & Attilio Guarneri, The Protection of Genetic Identity, 1
J. Civ. L. Stud. 139, 186 (2008); see also Richards & Solove, supra note 110, at 126–27
(identifying American privacy law’s individualistic focus).
144. Caulfield et al., supra note 72, at 432.
145. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
146. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). For an overview of the
scholarly debate as to whether the “bundle of rights” or “bundle of sticks” metaphor is
appropriate for private property, see generally Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?,
8 Econ. J. Watch 193 (2011).
147. See supra Part II (discussing property theory’s treatment of identifiable genetic
information). As discussed at infra Parts IV and V, an atomistic property approach is not
inevitable.
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Existing rules—whether statutory, regulatory, or judicial in nature—
cannot hope to address the more numerous stakeholders that have an
interest in a single cell’s genetic information as a matter of biological
fact. As this Part explains, that is so because identifiable genetic infor-
mation is shared, immutably and involuntarily, and that shared nature
renders existing rules a poor fit for adjudicating claims to genetic infor-
mation. If we are to take seriously the multiple and competing interests
in identifiable genetic information, these kinds of traditional rules and
approaches are inadequate.
A. Identifiable Genetic Information Is Shared
As I have suggested elsewhere, genetic information is decidedly not
atomistic.148 Children and parents share roughly 50% of their genetic
variations due to relatedness, while the mix of genetic variation full sib-
lings inherit from their parents, taken together, is also roughly 50% simi-
lar.149 Identical twins, of course, are very nearly genetically identical.150
This substantial genetic similarity among closely related individuals
occurs in the thirteen regions of noncoding DNA analyzed to create
CODIS profiles. Indeed, it is the predictable patterns of that similarity
that makes forensic familial identification possible. The fact that genetic
information is shared also means that medical or other information
revealed through genetic analysis may affect close genetic relatives as
well. A child’s genetic information discloses that at least one parent car-
ries the same sequence, and the presence of a particular gene variant in a
parent or sibling indicates an increased likelihood that that variant is also
present in another family member. Accordingly, the shared nature of
identifiable genetic information means that individuals’ authority to con-
trol their “own” identifiable genetic information may be affected by how
the government, research entities, or genetic testing firms make use of
genetic information drawn from close genetic relatives. As one expert
put it: “[T]he fact of the matter is that my DNA is not just my DNA. It’s
my family’s DNA. It’s related to my sons. It’s related to my mom. It’s
related to my sister.”151
At a minimum, the shared nature of identifiable genetic information
means that the popular analogy between genetic profiles and finger-
148. See Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111, at 132 (“More problematic still for
current approaches to protecting relevant interests is the fact that genetic material is
identifying not only to the person who provides it, but also to her close family members.”);
Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 791–93 (discussing unsuitability of current Fourth
Amendment doctrine for addressing constitutionality of source-excluding partial matching
because that doctrine fails to account for ways identifying genetic information is shared).
149. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing patterns of genetic
inheritance).
150. See Hartl, supra note 22, at 546 (defining identical twins as “[t]wins developed
from a single fertilized egg that splits into two embryos at an early division”).
151. Hudson, supra note 85, at 445.
900 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:873
prints is inapt when partial matching is at issue. That is so because,
“unlike DNA, fingerprints have a limited identification value. By them-
selves, fingerprints cannot reveal any more information about the person
from whom they have been collected (other than a prior criminal rec-
ord).”152 Whether as a matter of science or of social policy, fingerprints
are identifying only to the person from whom they come.153
Moreover, the agreement between the Lacks family and the NIH
governing access to HeLa genome data is built in part on real and pre-
sent concerns about the genetic interests of Lacks’s family members aris-
ing out of the shared nature of that genome data.154 As bioethicist Bartha
Knoppers observed, “The family is saying, having sequenced her,
[researchers have] sequenced them.”155 While the NIH agreement was an
important vindication of a long-lapsed ethical obligation to Lacks her-
self,156 it also was an important vindication of the interest Lacks’s family
members have in their identifiable genetic information.
At least one court has grounded a claim of control over the genetic
information of another on the shared nature of identifiable genetic
information. In Gu∂mundsdóttir v. Iceland, the Icelandic Supreme Court
determined that an individual exercising the right to opt out of a genetic
database may require the exclusion not only of her own genetic
sequence, but also that of her deceased father.157 Iceland boasts the
world’s most comprehensive genetic database: “a national database—
DeCode—to maintain healthcare records and store genetic infor-
mation . . . intended to give Iceland a global edge in medical research.”158
152. Joh, Reclaiming, supra note 119, at 870.
153. Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111, at 132. Simon Cole has argued that “the
widespread view of fingerprints as devoid of information stems from a social decision not
to invest in research exploring correlations between fingerprint patterns and race,
ethnicity, disease, and behavioral propensities, not from a biological absence of such
correlations.” Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54,
61 (2007). But whether it is a matter of biology or social policy, the fact remains that
fingerprints have not been plumbed for information about the close relatives of
fingerprint sources. DNA has. Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest that fingerprints and
DNA are similar because both might give rise to identification of close genetic relatives—
only the latter, and not the former, has been exploited for that identification information.
See Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2010) (acknowledging “[a]rguably, the
government’s use of CODIS to discover partial matches could raise privacy concerns not
raised by a traditional fingerprint database,” but declining to consider issue).
154. See Caplan, supra note 5 (noting tension between scientific interest of retaining
cells and privacy interests of Lacks’s family).
155. Ewen Callaway, HeLa Publication Brews Bioethical Storm, Nature (Mar. 27,
2013), http://www.nature.com/news/hela-publication-brews-bioethical-storm-1.12689 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
156. Caplan, supra note 5 (describing settlement as “ethical victory”).
157. Gu∂mundsdóttir v. Iceland [Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 2003, No. 151/2003,
(Ice.), available at https://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
158. See Gabel, supra note 52, at 51.
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Pursuant to Icelandic law, participation in DeCode is assumed, and
“persons who do not want information on them to be entered into the
database can prevent this by a notification to the Medical Director of
Health.”159 Since 2000, more than 20,000 people have exercised that
option.160
In Gu∂mundsdóttir, the appellant, a minor, requested that “the
genealogical or genetic information on the appellant’s father should not
be transferred into the database.”161 The Medical Director of Health
refused this request on the basis that the statute does not permit
descendants to refuse the transfer of information about their deceased
parents into the database.162 The Icelandic Supreme Court agreed that
the appellant could not exercise the statutory opt-out “as her deceased
father’s substitute.”163 But the court went on to find that the appellant
“has a personal interest in preventing the transfer of data from her
father’s medical records to the Health Sector database, as it is possible to
infer, from the data, information relating to her father’s hereditary
characteristics which could also apply to herself.”164 In view of the exten-
sive information included in the database, the court found that the
appellant’s personal privacy could not be assured.165 The court therefore
recognized the appellant’s right to request exclusion of her deceased
father’s information from the database—a right grounded on the appel-
lant’s own personal privacy interest, not her father’s.166 The Icelandic
Supreme Court’s analysis indicates that the shared nature of identifiable
genetic information may have serious legal implications.
Nonetheless, not all genetic relatives share so substantial a portion
of their genetic variation. While it is difficult to draw bright lines in the
genetic family tree demarcating “strong” versus “weak” genetic
commonality, as one moves out along the family tree, the statistical por-
tion of common genetic information due to relatedness diminishes rap-
idly. Half-siblings are likely to be roughly 25% genetically similar, as are
genetically related grandparents and grandchildren. First cousins are
expected to be 12.5% genetically similar due to relatedness, while first
cousins once-removed will be roughly 6.25% genetically similar. Genetic
relatedness in second cousins drops to 3.125% and to less than 1% for
159. Gu∂mundsdóttir, No. 151/2003, at 3.
160. Gabel, supra note 52, at 51.
161. Gu∂mundsdóttir, No. 151/2003, at 4.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 4–5.
165. See id. at 9 (holding constitutionally assured protection of privacy “cannot be
replaced by various forms of monitoring” nor by “leav[ing] it in the hands of the Minister”
or other officials to establish operating rules or procedures).
166. See id. at 10 (“[T]aking into account the principles of Icelandic legislation
concerning protection of privacy, the Court recognises the right of the Appellant in this
respect.”).
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third cousins. As a result, forensic familial identification focuses almost
exclusively on immediate-family relations; that is, on parents, siblings,
and children.167 While in some circumstances, whole families or com-
munities may share common genetic interests, 168 most of the time
167. See, e.g., Green, supra note 8 (reporting Virginia forensic laboratory involved in
Holloway case, in reporting partial DNA match to investigators, “made it clear that the
person whose DNA was in the database was eliminated as the suspect, but he could be the
father, son or brother of the perpetrator” (emphasis added)).
168. For example, multigenerational male lines within families share a common Y-
chromosome, which may have criminal and other consequences beyond the immediate
family. Investigators in Boston took advantage of patterns of Y-chromosome inheritance in
2013 in confirming the identity of the so-called Boston Strangler, who committed eleven
murders between 1962 and 1964. Jess Bidgood, 50 Years Later, a Break in a Boston
Strangler Case, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/us/dna-
evidence-identified-in-boston-strangler-case.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Investigators had long suspected that Albert DeSalvo was the Boston Strangler,
but they had been unable to confirm the link before DeSalvo’s death in 1973. Id. When
investigators revisited the case armed with modern forensic technology, however, they
turned to DeSalvo’s relatives for a genetic link to old crime-scene evidence. The link came
in the form of DeSalvo’s nephew, whose discarded water bottle the police surreptitiously
collected and analyzed. Carolyn Y. Johnson, How DNA Evidence Points to Albert DeSalvo,
Bos. Globe (July 12, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/07/11/how-dna-
evidence-linked-desalvo-last-boston-strangler-murder/s7Wi0L8cgwP4JKfwX5WZSK/story.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). DeSalvo and his nephew (the son of DeSalvo’s
brother) share nearly identical DNA profiles of their Y-chromosomes—a portion of DNA
that sons inherit in full from their fathers. Id. The DNA profile obtained from the
discarded water bottle was sufficiently similar to genetic material found on the body of the
Boston Strangler’s last victim that a judge authorized exhumation of DeSalvo’s body for
confirmatory testing. Bidgood, supra. That testing established that DeSalvo’s DNA did
indeed match the crime scene evidence, providing what Suffolk County District Attorney
Daniel Conley called an “‘unprecedented level of certainty’” that DeSalvo committed the
crime in question. Doug Stanglin, DNA Test Ties Albert DeSalvo to Boston Strangler
Victim, USA Today (July 19, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/07/19/boston-strangler-albert-desalvo-dna-tests/2568599/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
Beyond the family, in rare circumstances, communities may share common genetic
interests. For instance, the Havasupai, a small, isolated Native American tribe living in the
Grand Canyon, won a settlement from Arizona State University related to research that
implicated the genetic interests of the whole tribe. See Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins
Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
settlement as “significant because it implied that the rights of research subjects can be
violated when they are not fully informed about how their DNA might be used”). A
fraction of the Havasupai tribe’s members provided tissue to University researchers for
genetic research related to diabetes. Id. They later learned that the researchers had used
their genetic information for other studies, including some that directly undermined the
tribe’s core religious beliefs about their origins. Id. Such research, the tribe’s members
explained, inflicted an injury on the whole community: “It hurts the elders who have been
telling these [origin] stories to our grandchildren.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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genetic relatedness must be close for genetic information drawn from
one individual’s cells to be legitimately informative about others.169
B. Identifiable Genetic Information Is Immutably Shared
Genetic connections cannot be broken. Short of large-scale gene
therapy,170 the genetic information an individual inherits from her par-
ents is the genetic information she will always have. And her genetic
information will always, to some degree, also contain some identifiable
information for her parents, siblings, children, and other genetic rela-
tives. As one commentator has recognized in another context, “unlike a
stolen credit card or bank account number, once your genetic infor-
mation is exposed without your consent, nothing can be done to sever
your connections to that information.”171
The immutable nature of genetic information further complicates
attempts to account for individuals’ interests in their identifiable genetic
information. Exit, an ordinarily crucial element in mediating relation-
ships between multiple parties, is unavailable where genetic information
is concerned.172 An individual cannot simply sell or otherwise alienate
her interest in her genetic information and thereby no longer be genet-
ically similar to her close genetic relatives. Thus, frameworks that depend
on the ability to easily sever one’s relationships with co-owners or confi-
dants are inapt. Consider, for instance, the case of civil forfeiture of co-
occupied properties involved in criminal activity. Under federal law,
“When a non-owner uses another’s property as the site for a drug
offense, the owners must, to prevent forfeiture of the property, prove to a
federal court either that they had no knowledge of any wrongdoing or
that they did all they reasonably could have done to prevent the illegal
conduct.”173 Courts have sometimes applied this rule to permit forfeiture
of property where an owner or co-owner could have removed the
offender—even if a close family member—from the home and failed to
169 . As discussed infra, both GINA and current practices of familial forensic
identification draw lines about how much genetic similarity due to relatedness is enough
to be exploited by third parties—the former embracing extended relations who may have
as little as 6.25% genetic similarity on average arising from relatedness, and the latter
focusing almost exclusively on the immediate family (an individual’s parents, siblings, and
children). See infra notes 244–250 and accompanying text (describing two methods of
line-drawing for individual genetic interests).
These sources of law provide guidance about how much (or rather, how little) genetic
similarity is necessary in the ordinary course to make an individual sufficiently identifiable
through the genetic material of a relative, thus giving rise to the kinds of interests and
protections set out in this Article.
170. At present, large-scale gene therapy remains possible only in science fiction.
171. Joh, DNA Theft, supra note 115, at 681.
172. See Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111, at 129 (emphasizing importance of
threat of exit as means for ensuring respect for one’s choices).
173. Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug
Asset Forfeiture, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 343, 343 (1996).
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do so.174 Contrary to the shared nature of a co-occupied home, the
shared nature of identifiable genetic information is not subject to sever-
ance. Accordingly, analogies to forms of shared interests that are easy to
break or easy to exit will not suffice.
C. Identifiable Genetic Information Is Non-Volitionally Shared
Individuals do not voluntarily share identifying genetic information
in common with their close genetic relatives.175 Genetic similarity is a pro-
duct of biology, not choice. “[W]e all well know that we do not choose
the families into which we are born.”176 Parents might be said to share
their identifiable genetic material volitionally by choosing to procreate,
but even that notion of voluntariness is open to question. 177 At a
minimum, there is no sense in which children may be said to have cho-
sen their genetic parents, and siblings likewise do not control whether
their parents have additional children. Thus, the number and identity of
one’s close genetic relatives is most often out of one’s control.
Here again, this feature complicates the ordinary frameworks
applied to genetic information. Most saliently, “[i]n light of the
involuntariness and intractability of the genetic link, . . . it seems in-
defensible to claim a voluntary relinquishment of privacy by the relative
on account of mere biology.”178
Voluntariness shapes the scope of many legal rights. As set forth
above, civil forfeiture sometimes turns on the voluntary decision of an
174. See, e.g., United States v. 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1994)
(permitting forfeiture of family home where adult children possessed narcotics on
premises and “Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalez could have given their adult children an ultimatum:
Comply with the law or move out”); United States v. 4.14 Acres, 801 F. Supp. 737, 742–43
(S.D. Ga. 1992) (ordering forfeiture of defendant’s property due to defendant’s failure to
remove drug-selling daughters from home, despite other actions by defendant to oppose
daughters’ drug activities). Property owners in these kinds of cases are deemed not to be
“innocent” within the meaning of the forfeiture statute.
Demands for exit or removal of an offending party are different where the wrongdoer
owns the property in question with a possible “innocent owner” as tenants by the entirety.
At least one court has rejected a requirement that a spouse must seek divorce or partition
in order to prevail as an “innocent owner.” See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d
618, 627 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Certainly the government’s suggestion that an innocent spouse
should seek partition of the entireties property not only lacks legal substance but, in any
event, defies marital reality.”); Guerra, supra note 173, at 377 (discussing cases involving
jointly owned property, including 6109 Grubb Road); see also infra notes 295–301 and
accompanying text (discussing application of federal civil forfeiture statute to entireties
properties).
175. Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 793.
176. Murphy, supra note 18, at 336.
177. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1115 (2008) (considering whether law should recognize right not to be genetic
parent and what scope that right might have).
178. Murphy, supra note 18, at 337.
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owner or co-owner to continue to share property with a criminal.179 The
tort of public disclosure of private facts has been held to turn on one’s
voluntary public appearance.180 And courts have deemed the Fourth
Amendment inapplicable to information individuals voluntarily share
with others.181
Notions of abandonment, which play a key role in both research and
forensic uses of genetic information, similarly turn on some notion of
volition—the “knowing exposure” of material or information to the pub-
lic.182 In the research context, “the principle most commonly applied
seems to be that of ‘finders keepers’ where pathologists, physicians, and
researchers who have access to patient tissue feel no qualms about keep-
179. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text (discussing role of occupancy
choice in civil forfeiture context).
180. See, e.g., Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979) (“The appearance of a person in a public place necessarily involves doffing the
cloak of privacy which the law protects.”); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765,
769 (N.Y. 1970) (“[T]here can be no invasion of privacy where the information sought is
open to public view or has been voluntarily revealed to others.” (emphasis added));
McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding newspaper immune from tort liability for publishing photo of high school
athlete’s inadvertently exposed genitalia during game and explaining “[a]t the time the
photograph was taken, McNamara was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport at a
public place” (emphasis added)). But see Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 771 (“A person does not
automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public place, and the
mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right to try to discover the
amount of money he was withdrawing.”).
181. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding installing pen register
without warrant does not violate Fourth Amendment because, “[w]hen he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“All of the documents
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.” (emphasis added)); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because a cell phone user makes a choice . . . to make a
call, and because he knows that the call conveys cell site information . . . he voluntarily
conveys his cell site data each time he makes a call.” (emphasis added)). But see United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
On the view that the third-party doctrine is a functional consent test, see Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 588–90 (2009).
182. See Joh, Reclaiming, supra note 119, at 865 (noting Fourth Amendment does
not apply in cases where DNA is recovered from abandoned objects “‘knowingly exposed’
to the public”); see also United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“To
determine whether there is abandonment in the fourth amendment sense, the . . . court
must focus on the intent of the person who is alleged to have abandoned the place or
object.”); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the
search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the
property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to it . . . .”).
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ing it for their own use, beyond the purposes for which the tissue was col-
lected.”183 The rule of “finders keepers” at work here stems from the doc-
trine of abandonment, in which the former title-holder surrenders all
rights to the object in question, and title is assigned to the first person
who takes possession.184 In the forensic context, individuals have been
held to have “abandoned” genetic material left on cigarette butts, coffee
cups, and envelopes, such that analysis of that material did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment.185
None of these legal limitations is appropriate in the context of
shared identifiable genetic information. That information is not
voluntarily shared or exposed by the close genetic relative of one whose
cells are used for genetic analysis. We do not “voluntarily participate,”
“knowingly expose,” or otherwise “abandon” our identifiable genetic
information in another person’s cells. We can be identified, at least par-
tially, through those cells as a matter of biology, not choice. The project
of respecting one’s interest in identifiable genetic information thus is
complicated still further.
IV. LOOKING TO TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
Accounting for the embedded relationships that identifiable genetic
information embodies requires a legal framework familiar with similarly
fixed features. Such a framework may be found in many spheres of law.
Just as a variety of legal interests touch on identifiable genetic in-
formation,186 an array of legal analogies are available for thinking about
that information in all its complexity. Possible frameworks may be drawn
from property,187 intellectual property,188 tort,189 and business administra-
tion,190 among others. And general principles also may guide decision-
183. Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 22,
23 (2005); see also Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111, at 171–72 (discussing
abandonment in context of human tissue research).
184. Dukeminier et al., Property 112 (8th ed. 2014).
185. See Joh, Reclaiming, supra note 119, at 860–62 (collecting and discussing cases).
186. See supra notes 105–138 and accompanying text (analyzing legal interest in
genetic information).
187. See infra notes 202–204 (identifying sources describing property-based analo-
gies for shared identifiable genetic information); infra notes 205–212 and accompanying
text (identifying variety of property forms involving shared interests).
188. See, e.g., 1 Chisum on Patents § 2.02 (joint inventorship); 1 Nimmer on
Copyright §§ 6.01–.12 (joint authorship); see also Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111,
at 141–55 (introducing “informational property” model for addressing interests of tissue
providers in cells and genetic information they contribute to research and explaining
model “adopts the contours of American intellectual property”).
189. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 110, at 156–59 (describing American
tort of breach of confidence for unconsented-to disclosures).
190. See, e.g., 7 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 50.08 (Michael Allen
Wolf, ed., 2000) (identifying “tenancy in partnership” as one of several forms of con-
current ownership).
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making in approaching this difficult problem, including principles of
efficiency191 or fairness.192
This Article focuses on a property framework, and more specifically
on the law of tenancy by the entirety. The use of the word “framework”
here is deliberate. This Article is not intended to suggest that interests in
genetic information are or should be thought of strictly as property inter-
ests or that courts should invoke the law of tenancy by the entirety in
adjudicating cases involving claims to DNA. Rather, this Article’s aims are
more limited: Legal institutions, in grappling to make policy regarding
shared identifiable genetic information, would do well to look to other
areas of the law—including property law, and more specifically the law
surrounding tenancy by the entirety—as a guide for how to deal seriously
with fundamentally shared interests. In other words, discussion of prop-
erty interests and tenancy by the entirety can serve as a useful starting
point in thinking about how identifiable genetic information can best be
regulated to take its shared nature into account.
While the law of property is just one possible framework among
many, it is a logical one with which to begin. As identified earlier, several
states have declared that genetic information is property—property of
the individual “to whom the information pertains.”193 Moreover, at least
one court has expressly treated genetic information, apart from the cells
from which that information was derived, as property.194 In United States v.
Kriesel, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a convicted offender who had
completed his period of supervised release had standing to seek return
of the blood sample taken from him for forensic analysis as a condition
of that release.195 The court affirmed that Kriesel was “seeking the return
of ‘property.’ . . . [T]he blood sample itself is a tangible object, and the
genetic code contained within the blood sample is information.”196 To be
sure, property claims related to human biological materials have not
always fared well; for instance, in the famous Moore v. Regents suit, the
California Supreme Court rejected a conversion claim.197 But cases like
191. See, e.g., Michael E. Smith, Let’s Make the DNA Identification Database as
Inclusive as Possible, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 385, 386 (2006) (invoking efficiency in arguing
for expanding forensic DNA databases).
192. See, e.g., Greely et al., supra note 35, at 258–59 (concluding African Americans,
overrepresented in CODIS, “are likely to oppose family forensic DNA” as “racist action by
the American criminal justice system” and suggesting this unfairness “deserves attention in
the context of America’s historical and current problems with race”).
193. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2014); see also Fla. Stat. § 760.40(2)(a)
(2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 33-54-1(1) (2013); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:1023(E) (2014).
194. United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2013).
195. Id. at 1147.
196. Id. at 1144–45.
197. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990); see also
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing Washington
University as exclusive owner of tissues provided by patients seeing urological specialist at
University); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
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Moore have usually focused on the physical cells at issue, rather than the
identifiable genetic information those cells contain.198 Accordingly, prop-
erty offers a useful lens through which to consider how individuals may
effectuate their interests in identifiable genetic information. Moreover,
while property-based rules related to genetic information to date may
have focused only on an individual’s relationship to the genetic infor-
mation drawn from her own cells, those rules nonetheless provide a legal
basis for considering an individual’s interest in her identifiable genetic
information more broadly.
In particular, property offers a more advantageous lens for address-
ing shared interests in identifiable genetic information than its chief
competitor, the law of privacy. As discussed above, the law of privacy is
unitary in nature, “centered around the individual’s inviolate personal-
ity.”199 “American privacy law has never fully embraced privacy within
relationships; it typically views information exposed to others as no
longer private.”200 While privacy law has much to recommend it when we
ask about the interests of individual stakeholders against outsiders, it is
less helpful when we ask how such interests should work in the context of
relationships and overlapping, shared interests. Property law is more
suited to guide our efforts in the latter circumstance. American property
law is rich with forms of shared property interests, including the tenancy
by the entirety that is the focus of this Article.201
Indeed, others similarly have identified the usefulness of the prop-
erty lens in addressing the shared nature of identifiable genetic infor-
mation precisely because shared property interests, unlike shared privacy
interests, are well known in the law. Thus, Laura Maria Franciosi and
Attilio Guarneri have observed that, rather than privacy, “property laws
may better serve as a paradigm to ensure that a greater level of protec-
tion is provided for information that belongs to all of the individuals
involved.”202 These authors specifically identified that “the theme of joint
ownership (joint tenancy, co-ownership) could be applied. These norms
in fact would allow disciplining potential conflicts among individuals that
1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing conversion claim). But see supra note 105
(explaining these cases do not necessarily require rejection of all property rights in human
biological materials).
198. See supra Part II (explaining genetic information often is treated differently).
199. Richards & Solove, supra note 110, at 127.
200. Id. at 126.
201. See 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 49.01 (noting tenancies by the entirety are one
of four categories of concurrent ownership). To date, and as discussed above, those forms
largely have not come to the fore in current policy governing identifiable genetic
information.
202. Franciosi & Guarneri, supra note 143, at 186. Franciosi and Guarneri critique
the privacy paradigm because “the current configuration of American privacy law
provisions” is “structured over a strictly individualistic concept of private information,”
while “the nature of genetic information is common to a group and not merely to a single
individual.” Id.
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hold the same right.”203 Erin Murphy similarly has remarked that “a rela-
tives’ [sic] protectable interest in the privacy of their half of the data-
based kin’s genetic code . . . could be likened to the joint interest held by
property owners who share common space.”204 But these scholars have
not explored these analogues in depth.
As these scholars indicate, the law of property, like the law more
generally, offers a multitude of possibilities that may serve as a basis for
analogy. One property treatise has commented that “[t]he idea of two or
more people being simultaneously the owners of the same [thing] is very
old.”205 Shared ownership interests include:
four categories of substantial antiquity, tenancies in coparce-
nary, joint tenancies, tenancies in common, tenancies by the
entireties; one category imported since 1800 from the civil law,
community property; another borrowed from the civil law as
late as 1961, the condominium; and three categories invented
to meet recently realized business and economic needs, the ten-
ancy in partnership, the cooperative, and time-sharing.206
Moreover, shared property interests may include leaseholds in which
“two or more persons have interests in property, but at least one of them
is not in possession.”207
Each of these property forms has developed law governing what
each owner or interested party may do with the shared property and what
actions co-owners or co-tenants may take to prevent or profit from each
other’s conduct. Thus, co-tenants in common generally are entitled to
use and enjoy the whole property and unilaterally to encumber their own
shares of the property, giving access or ownership in the property to
others even without their co-owners’ consent.208 Condominium associa-
tions, which “join[] separate ownership of one’s unit with an undivided
interest in the common elements,”209 ordinarily establish voting rules by
agreement for addressing issues in common elements.210 These property
associations may require majority, super-majority, or unanimous consent
to take certain actions with respect to shared elements or even individu-
ally owned portions of the property.211 And leaseholds require, among
203. Id.
204. Murphy, supra note 18, at 336. But see Kaye, supra note 112, at 162 n.328
(rejecting Murphy’s co-occupancy argument).
205. 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 49.01.
206. Id.
207. Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in
American Property Law, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1055, 1056 (2011).
208. 7 Powell, supra note 190, §§ 50.03–.06.
209. Id. § 49.01.
210. Id. § 54.03.
211. Id.
910 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:873
other things, that a tenant in possession not engage in conduct that
“injur[es] the absent owner’s interest in the property.”212
Among these, tenancy by the entirety is the most useful place to
start. Although the details of tenancy by the entirety differ from state to
state, a substantial number of states still retain this property form, with
many retaining it in a form conducive to the discussion that follows.213
Tenancy by the entirety and interests in shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation are similar in foundational, descriptive, and historical ways. As set
forth in more detail below, these two are foundationally similar because
both implicate a unity of identity as an essential attribute and both derive
from certain close familial relationships. These shared essential features
give rise to similar descriptive features, including the ways in which inter-
ests in both tenancy by the entirety and shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation are overlapping and difficult, or impossible, to break. Tenancy by
the entirety offers historical kinship for interests in shared identifiable
genetic information, in that tenancy by the entirety has developed from a
one-relevant-decisionmaker model into a largely egalitarian property
framework, a transformation sorely needed in accounting for interests in
shared identifiable genetic information.
Other shared property arrangements offer much less by way of
similarity to interests in shared identifiable genetic information. Tenan-
cies in common and leaseholds purposely create easily terminable
relationships among interest-holders, and so are unlike the unbreakable
bond of genetic relatedness. Even joint tenancies with a right of survivor-
ship usually are unilaterally severable.214 None of these property forms is
limited, like tenancy by the entirety, to already-established familial rela-
tions. As such, though they offer models of shared property, they share
neither foundational nor structural kinship with interests in shared
identifiable genetic information. The law of tenancy by the entirety does
both.
A. Foundational Kinship
Both tenancy by the entirety and shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation involve at least partial unity of identity—one a legal fiction, the
other a biological fact. Tenancy by the entirety is a property form
traditionally available only to married persons.215 It is built on a legal fic-
tion that spouses are “one person at law,” such that neither spouse
212. Merrill, supra note 207, at 1056.
213. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 345 (observing “tenancy by the entirety
exists today in fewer than half the states”); 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.01(3)
(identifying each state’s approach to tenancy by the entirety).
214. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 208; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L.J. 72, 77 (2005) (“Some states allow
unilateral conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common; others do not.”
(footnotes omitted)).
215. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 280 (2002).
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“own[s] any individual interest in the estate; rather it belong[s] to the
couple.”216 This unity persists in order to give each spouse authority and
responsibility with respect to their shared property.217 Genetic infor-
mation among closely related individuals also exhibits a unity of identity,
in this instance, a biological one. As discussed above, genetic information
among closely related persons is inextricably shared. Some portion of
that information, probabilistically calculated and biologically deter-
mined, is the same, springing from a common source. If legal institutions
hope to take seriously individuals’ interests in their identifiable genetic
information, then there is a need to create shared authority and
responsibility for those portions of identifiable genetic information that
each individual shares with her close genetic relatives.
Moreover, both tenancy by the entirety and shared identifiable
genetic information are focused on the family. Again, tenancy by the
entirety ordinarily is available only to married persons,218 and so it neces-
sarily contemplates organizing shared property interests within the
family. As the Hawaii Supreme Court observed in embracing modern
tenancy by the entirety, “‘The interest in family solidarity retains some
influence upon the institution of tenancy by the entirety.’”219 In affirming
the continued use of tenancy by the entirety, that court described itself as
protecting “the interests of the family unit.” 220 Interests in shared
identifiable genetic information are also necessarily about family, as that
information is shared more closely among close genetic relatives. To be
sure, families are social constructs.221 But they also often reflect genetic
relationships.222 The family thus is a core feature of both tenancy by the
entirety and shared identifiable genetic information. Workable govern-
ance for shared identifiable genetic information, like the tenancy by the
entirety, must take seriously “the interests of the family unit,” specifically
those borne of genetic relatedness.
216. Id. at 281.
217. See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1853, 1885
(2012) (“This institution encourages both parties to keep each other informed regarding
use of their jointly owned property because the exercise of property rights depends upon
the other’s consent.”).
218. But see Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 509-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (permitting any two
“reciprocal beneficiaries,” including siblings and parent-child pairs, to hold real property
in any type of concurrent estate, including as tenants by the entirety).
219. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1297 (Haw. 1977) (quoting Fairclaw v. Forrest,
130 F.2d 829, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1942)) (alterations omitted).
220. Id.
221. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in
Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics
263, 270 (2006) (explaining relationships are more likely to be built up between
“individuals who had assumed that the link existed, for example, as parent-child or
brother-sister”); Murphy, supra note 18, at 315 (“In our society, families are largely social,
not biological, constructs.”).
222. Murphy, supra note 18, at 315.
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B. Structural Kinship
This focus on family drives “[t]he structure of the tenancy by the
entirety,” which in its modern form “envisions a particular kind of
relationship that depends on communication between cotenants.”223 Ten-
ancy by the entirety considers neither spouse to “own any individual
interest in the estate; rather it belong[s] to the couple,”224 and therefore
the estate may be severed only by divorce, joint conveyance, or convey-
ance from one co-owner to the other.225 Indeed, a key feature of tenancy
by the entirety is that typically “[n]either spouse may unilaterally alienate
or encumber the property.”226 An encumbrance includes any right or
claim to property other than an ownership interest.227 In the context of
tenancy by the entirety, rights held by individuals or institutions external
to the married pair are likely to be encumbrances on the property.
This feature of tenancy by the entirety makes it quite unlike most
joint tenancies, in which “any one joint tenant can convert a joint ten-
ancy into a tenancy in common unilaterally by conveying his interest to a
third party.”228 Owners who hold as tenants by the entirety are bound
together much more firmly. Unilateral conveyances of an entireties prop-
erty do not sever the tenancy; they are simply void.229 In most states,
223. Alexander, supra note 217, at 1885.
224. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002).
225. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.102 (West 2005) (stating divorce creates
tenancy in common “unless the ownership thereof is otherwise determined by the decree
of divorce”); id. § 557.101 (“[T]enancy by the entirety may be terminated by a conveyance
from either one to the other of his or her interest in the land so held.”); United States v.
2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The entireties estate may also be
destroyed through a joint conveyance of the property by husband and wife . . . .”); United
States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1514 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990) (describing how
tenancy by the entirety can terminate pursuant to Florida law); see also John V. Orth,
Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997
BYU L. Rev. 35, 39 (“Not having a share at all, it necessarily followed that neither had an
alienable share.”).
226. Craft, 535 U.S. at 282; see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 245 (linking
survival of tenancy by the entirety to inability to unilaterally assign one’s interest in
property so held); Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Traditional
Version of the Tenancy Is the Best Alternative for Married Couples, Common Law
Marriages, and Same-Sex Partnerships, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 23, 34–35 n.77 (2008) (categorizing
forms of tenancy by the entirety in states retaining that property form and indicating
protection of entireties property from unilateral creditors is rule in plurality of those
states).
227 . Black’s Law Dictionary 644 (Bryan Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014) (defining
“encumbrance” as “claim or liability that is attached to property or some other right and
that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage; any property right that is not an
ownership interest”).
228. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 224; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 214, at 77 (“Some states allow unilateral conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy
in common; others do not.”).
229. See, e.g., Tkachik v. Mandeville, 790 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Mich. 2010) (“[W]hen
title to real estate is vested in a husband and wife by the entirety, separate alienation by
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creditors of a single owner cannot reach a tenancy by the entirety as a
result of this rule.230 And upon the death of one spouse, “‘the whole must
remain to the survivor.’”231
Tenancy by the entirety thus “encourages both parties to keep each
other informed regarding use of their jointly-owned property because
the exercise of property rights depends upon the other’s consent.”232
Like modern tenancy by the entirety, shared decisionmaking should be
prized where shared interests, like those in identifiable genetic infor-
mation, implicate individual identity and autonomy. Thoughtful govern-
ance of identifiable genetic information, in other words, also should
“envision[] a particular kind of relationship” in which its members are in
some ways accountable to one another.233
Indeed, the restraints that tenancy by the entirety imposes commend
this framework for yet another reason. The tenancy by the entirety frame-
work not only protects the core of the property interest in shared
identifiable genetic information; it also modifies some of the other sticks
in the traditional bundle of rights—for instance, the right of alienation—
in ways that are privacy-protecting. Thus, while GINA and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule seek to protect privacy by requiring an individual’s
authorization before her identifiable genetic information is disclosed or
used in research, so too does the tenancy by the entirety framework.234
That framework renders unilateral conveyances void and therefore
requires an individual’s authorization before her identifiable genetic
one spouse only is barred.”); Ethridge v. TierOne Bank, 226 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Mo. 2007)
(“A deed by only one of two tenants by the entirety conveys nothing.”); Bellows Falls Trust
Co. v. Gibbs, 534 A.2d 210, 211 (Vt. 1987) (voiding mortgage note executed by only one
spouse).
230. See Rosich-Schwartz, supra note 226, at 34–35 n.77 (indicating protection of
entireties property from unilateral creditors is rule in plurality of states retaining tenancy
by the entirety); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 250 (“In a majority of states,
a creditor of one spouse cannot reach a tenancy by the entirety because one spouse
cannot assign his or her interest.”); 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.01(3) (identifying each
state’s approach to tenancy by the entirety).
This rule is subject to at least one exception. In Craft, the Supreme Court held that a
“husband’s interest in the entireties property constituted ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’”
to which a federal tax lien could attach. 535 U.S. at 288. The Court recognized that
“Michigan makes a different choice with respect to state law creditors.” Id. But the Court
explained that “exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Craft’s exception to the state law rule has not spread
throughout federal law. See, e.g., In re Brannon, 476 F.3d 170, 175 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2007)
(observing “joint filing in bankruptcy does not sever a tenancy by the entireties so as to
make the property available to creditors of either husband or wife individually” and
collecting cases in agreement).
231. Orth, supra note 225, at 39 (quoting 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 182 (photo.
reprint 1978) (R. Burn ed., 1783)).
232. Alexander, supra note 217, at 1885.
233. Id.
234. 45 C.F.R. § 1320d-9(a)(1) (2014) (defining “genetic information” as “health
information” under HIPAA).
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information is disclosed to or used by third parties, whether that infor-
mation resides in her own cells or those of her close genetic relative. In
so doing, the tenancy by the entirety model achieves the interests
undergirding modern policy governing the protection of identifiable
genetic information, whether voiced in the language of property or of
privacy.
At bottom, the key to the structural kinship between tenancy by the
entirety and interests in shared identifiable genetic information is that
both demand “a particularly difficult form of doublethink: to think about
two persons as though they were one.”235 While the source of this
“doublethink” may be different, the purposes served by the former may
be instructive as to the latter. Tenancy by the entirety imposes a legal fic-
tion in order to support and encourage shared governance within the
family. Respecting interests in shared identifiable genetic information
could do the same.
Tenancy by the entirety is not, however, a perfect structural fit for
shared identifiable genetic information. For one thing, unlike genetic
information, tenancy by the entirety is a shared relationship that is
voluntarily undertaken. In addition to being limited to two individuals,
marriage is legally a voluntary arrangement in this country. Indeed,
tenancies by the entirety often require deliberate action, as a tenancy by
the entirety is not a default rule in most states.236 And tenancies by the
entirety may be burdensome to create, as they require five “unities”:
time, title, interest, possession, and marriage.237 Nonetheless, the law sur-
rounding tenancies by the entirety indicates that the law is capable of
responding to circumstances in which property is shared without con-
sent—that is, involuntarily.238
For another, tenancy by the entirety only ever requires mutual con-
sent among two individuals, while those with interests in shared identifia-
ble genetic information will inevitably be more numerous. Again, ten-
ancy by the entirety is ordinarily available only to married persons, and in
the United States, legal marriage is limited to two individuals.239 By
235. Orth, supra note 225, at 40.
236. Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1517, 1541–42 (2003).
But see Beal Bank v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 54 (Fla. 2001) (explaining, as to real
property, “[a] conveyance to spouses as husband and wife creates an estate by the entirety
in the absence of express language showing a contrary intent,” while as to personal
property, “the intention of the parties must be proven” (alteration in original) (quoting In
re Estate of Suggs, 405 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); First Nat’l Bank v.
Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 780 (Fla. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
237. See, e.g., Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 52 (identifying these five unities and adding
also characteristic of survivorship).
238. See infra Part V.A (demonstrating how tenancy by the entirety framework can
apply to forensic familial identification, which involves sharing genetic information
without consent).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (explaining
lawful status of marriage “is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate
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contrast, children typically each have two genetic parents,240 yielding at
least three individuals who must agree before the child may encumber
the identifiable genetic material she shares with her parents. In many
instances, the number of interested parties will be even greater, as
individuals may have multiple siblings and children of their own, in addi-
tion to genetic parents.241
We might exploit this multiplicity of relevant actors to limit the
impact of tenancy by the entirety’s requirement of mutual consent,
envisioning that requirement as breaking a tie against encumbrance.
Under such an understanding, decisionmaking involving more than two
stakeholders would allow a majority to prevail over a less numerous
opposition. But that result seems inconsistent with the foundational
commitment of tenancy by the entirety to unity and with the right ten-
ancy by the entirety gives to each spouse “to protect [the property]
against outsiders.” 242 Such an interpretation of the tenancy by the
entirety framework, while more manageable, would undermine the
usefulness of that framework by betraying its fundamental attributes.243
Nonetheless, the scope and number of genetic relatives with whom
one shares a tenancy-by-the-entirety-like interest is not without limit.
Indeed, existing practices suggest two possible lines on which policymak-
ers may draw to capture the great majority of relevant interests.244 First,
GINA, which extends medical privacy protection to “genetic infor-
relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the
community equal with all other marriages.” (emphasis added)). In some states, tenancy by
the entirety is also available to domestic partners, individuals joined through civil union,
or other kinds of “reciprocal beneficiaries.” See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 509-2 (2006) (stating
“reciprocal beneficiaries” may hold property as tenants by the entirety). Even where this is
so, however, the maximum number of individuals who may be part of such a relationship
is two. See id. § 572C-3 (defining “reciprocal beneficiaries” as “two adults who are parties
to a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship”).
240. Korf, supra note 17, at 36. Three genetic parents are possible in assisted human
reproduction involving cytoplasmic transfer or mitochondrial DNA replacement therapy,
in which cytoplasm from one egg is transferred to another, yielding a mix of mitochon-
drial genetic material. See Jason A. Barritt et al., Cytoplasmic Transfer in Assisted
Reproduction, 7 Hum. Reprod. Update 428, 430 (2001) (discussing possibility of “mixing
mitochondria from one oocyte with another during ooplasmic donation”); Gretchen
Vogel & Erik Stokstad, U.K. Parliament Approves Controversial Three-Parent Mitochondrial
Gene Therapy, Science (Feb. 3, 2015, 2:00 PM), available at http://news.sciencemag.org/
biology/2015/02/u-k-parliament-approves-controversial-three-parent-mitochondrial-gene-
therapy (reporting U.K. House of Commons approved mitochondrial DNA replacement
therapy, which yields embryo with “nuclear DNA from the mother and father and
mitochondrial DNA from the egg donor”).
241. Korf, supra note 17, at 36.
242. 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.03(4).
243. As discussed at infra notes 345–348 and accompanying text, however, an action
for waste may provide a measure of protection against unreasonable holdouts or refusals
to respond in the context of securing familial consent for genetic research.
244. But see supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which
broader interests in shared identifiable genetic information may be relevant).
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mation,” defines an individual’s “genetic information” to include infor-
mation about “the genetic tests of family members of such individual.”245
Further provisions and regulations explain that “family members”
include up to “an individual’s great-great-grandparents, great-great-
grandchildren, and first cousins once-removed (i.e., the children of the
individual’s first cousins),” or such relatives of an individual’s depend-
ent.246 Such relatives may have as little as 6.25% genetic similarity on aver-
age arising from relatedness, and this group of “family members” may,
and often will be, substantial in number.247
Alternatively, other practices and research suggest a more managea-
ble line, at least for now, around the immediate family (parents, siblings,
and children). As set forth above, to date, forensic familial identification
focuses almost exclusively on immediate-family relations in deriving use-
ful leads for investigation.248 The result in Gu∂mundsdóttir249 is also con-
sistent with drawing a presumptive line around immediate family
members. Certain social science research reinforces an immediate-family
line as well, documenting that parents’ concerns about genetic related-
ness for their children extends much more strongly to full siblings than
even half siblings.250
C. Historical Kinship
The foregoing is relevant only to the modern form of tenancy by the
entirety. As a historical matter, tenancy by the entirety managed the
difficulties of treating “two persons as though they were one” by render-
245. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16) (2012) (defining “Genetic Information”).
246. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a) (2014).
247. See Rohlfs et al., Familial Identification, supra note 64, at 8 (“The kinship
coefficient for parent-offspring, sibling, half-sibling, first cousin, and second cousin
relationships are 0.25, 0.25, 0.125, 0.0625, and 0.015625, respectively . . . . [A]s the kinship
coefficient of the tested relationship approaches the population background
relatedness . . . it will become increasingly difficult to discern relatives from unrelated
individuals.”).
248. See, e.g., Green, supra note 8 (reporting Virginia forensic laboratory involved in
Holloway case, in reporting partial DNA match to investigators, “made it clear that the
person whose DNA was in the database was eliminated as the suspect, but he could be the
father, son or brother of the perpetrator” (emphasis added)).
249. See Gu∂mundsdóttir v. Iceland [Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 2003, No. 151/2003,
at 9–10 (Ice.), available at https://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (finding individual privacy grounds for allowing appellant
to block release of her deceased father’s genetic information, which could be used to infer
her own genome).
250. See Heather Widdows, Ethical Issues in Biobanking Oocytes and Embryos 9–10
(Dec. 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
interview subject “distinguished between full and half siblings,” deeming latter not
problematic); see also Giulia Zanini, Neither Gametes nor Children, 4 Tecnoscienza 87,
104 (2013) (reporting one respondent who expressed serious concerns about genetic
relatedness using donor embryos where other, full-sibling embryos exist, while expressing
little concern about half-sibling embryos for her child).
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ing the wife’s authority a virtual nullity.251 At common law, husbands, but
not wives, enjoyed rights of use even to the exclusion of their spouses,
and husbands were entitled to all of the rents and profits from entireties
properties.252 Indeed, “[t]he husband’s control of the property was so ex-
tensive that, despite the rules on alienation, the common law eventually
provided that he could unilaterally alienate entireties property without
severance subject only to the wife’s survivorship interest.”253 A few courts
even permitted creditors of the husband alone to secure liens against
entireties property.254
Beginning with Mississippi in 1839, however, states began to enact
Married Women’s Property Acts.255 By the end of the nineteenth century,
all common law property states had enacted similar statutes.256 These stat-
utes abolished the historical rule of coverture and recognized that wives,
like husbands, retained legal existence in marriage.257 Some states subse-
quently did away with tenancy by the entirety;258 others reshaped tenancy
by the entirety to preserve the legal fiction that married spouses are one
while recognizing the equality of its participants.259 In this latter group of
states, legal equality between spouses with respect to entireties property
often required additional legislative action and modernization, “a pro-
cess not completed until late in the twentieth century.”260 For many of
these states, it remains the case that “‘one tenant by the entirety has no
interest separable from that of the other,’”261 “each tenant by the entirety
possesses the right of survivorship,” and “[n]either spouse may unilater-
251. Orth, supra note 225, at 40–41; see also United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281
(2002) (explaining, at common law, the “one person at law . . . practically speaking, was
the husband”).
252. Orth, supra note 225, at 40.
253. Craft, 535 U.S. at 281.
254. See, e.g., Raptes v. Cheros, 155 N.E. 787, 787 (Mass. 1927) (“A tenancy by the
entirety may be taken on an execution issued against the husband, and the purchaser at
the sale on execution may maintain a writ of entry against him for possession and title.”);
Lewis v. Pate, 193 S.E. 20, 20 (N.C. 1937) (holding husband’s judgment creditor could
force sale of crops grown on land owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety).
255. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 385 (“Beginning with Mississippi in 1839,
all common law property states had, by the end of the nineteenth century, enacted
Married Women’s Property Acts.”).
256 . Id.; see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127, 2141–49 (1994)
(describing history of coverture-reform statutes’ passage).
257. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 385 (explaining “statutes removed the
disabilities of coverture and gave a married woman, like a single woman, control over all
her property”); Orth, supra note 225, at 41 (discussing statutes’ impact on tenancy by the
entirety).
258. Orth, supra note 225, at 41.
259. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281–82 (2002) (citing Michigan as example
of state retaining modified tenancy by the entirety).
260. Orth, supra note 225, at 42–44.
261. Craft, 535 U.S. at 282 (quoting Long v. Earle, 269 N.W. 577, 581 (Mich. 1936)).
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ally alienate or encumber the property, although this may be accom-
plished with mutual consent.”262 But contrary to its historical iteration,
modern tenancy by the entirety gives each spouse rights to “use the prop-
erty, exclude third parties from it, and receive an equal share of the
income produced by it.”263
This arduous and ongoing process of ameliorating the role of
women as tenants by the entirety may serve as a model for a similar and
much-needed shift in the law governing interests in shared identifiable
genetic information. The law of tenancy by the entirety for centuries
occluded women’s control completely in order to resolve the difficulty of
“think[ing] about two persons as though they were one.”264 Current legal
rules governing the use of identifiable genetic information similarly have
failed to acknowledge the identifiable genetic information about an
individual that is carried in the cells of her close relatives.265 Instead, with
rare exceptions, policymakers and courts have located any interests in
identifiable genetic information only in the individual whose cells are
analyzed.266 Taking interests in shared identifiable genetic information
seriously, however, requires recognizing that other stakeholders matter.
The modern shift toward egalitarian control of property held in tenancy
by the entirety may provide a model for a similar shift in the law govern-
ing DNA.267
V. APPLYING DNA BY THE ENTIRETY
The essential features that often make tenancy by the entirety diffi-
cult to accommodate in law and policy complement the essential and
difficult features of identifiable genetic information. Taking an individ-
ual’s interest in her identifiable genetic information seriously requires
accounting for the identifiable genetic information about that individual
that is carried in the cells of her close relatives—as well as the identifiable
genetic information she carries in her cells about those relatives. This
Part maps how the law of tenancy by the entirety may illuminate what
that accounting demands and considers how the law of tenancy by the
262. Id. at 281–82 (discussing Michigan’s modern law governing tenancy by the
entirety and describing this as “typical of the modern tenancy by the entirety”); see also
United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1990)
(describing similar features in Florida’s law of tenancy by the entirety).
263. Craft, 535 U.S. at 282.
264. Orth, supra note 225, at 40.
265. See supra Part III (explaining how concept of individual autonomy has led
courts to treat DNA as belonging only to individual from whom sample derives).
266. See supra Part II (“[E]xisting legal rules and doctrines addressing genetic
information largely have considered only the interest an individual has in identifiable
genetic information drawn from her own cells.”).
267. See Dagan, supra note 236, at 1542 (discussing tenancy by the entirety as “closer
to the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community than the alternatives in these
common law jurisdictions”).
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entirety may inform legal governance in three domains: forensic familial
identification, genetic research, and personal genetic testing.
In each domain, it falls to state and federal policymakers to abrogate
the unilateral control that the law ordinarily vests in an individual over all
the identifiable genetic information in her cells. As set forth above,
although tenancy by the entirety developed as a common law doctrine, it
required modernization through statutory enactments like Married
Women’s Property Acts to recognize the interests of both spouses in mari-
tal property and marital life.268 Similarly, in most instances, a statutory or
regulatory break from the past likely would be necessary for the law to
recognize the interests that close genetic relatives may have in the
genetic information encoded in one another’s cells. This Part identifies
one way for shaping such recognition.
A. Forensic Familial Identification
As explained at the outset, and as typified by the Holloway case,
source-excluding partial matches between known-offender profiles and
crime-scene samples may be useful because they can direct law enforce-
ment to investigate the close genetic relatives of the partially matching
offender. Identifiable genetic information is shared in specific and
predictable ways, such that close genetic relatives have more similar
genetic profiles than unrelated individuals. Source-excluding partial
matches have been successful in some cases.269 But these matches often
are false positives, which limits their informative power.270 Partial matches
may arise fortuitously during a database search intended to identify an
exact match, or they may be deliberately sought. As I have explained else-
268. See supra notes 255–263 and accompanying text (describing development and
purpose of Married Women’s Property Acts).
269. See, e.g., Greely et al., supra note 35, at 248–49 (describing “bloody brick” case
in which British police used partial match in DNA database to locate perpetrator’s brother
and, ultimately, perpetrator himself); Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 753–54 (describing
case of “Grim Sleeper,” in which genetic profile of murderer’s son led to suspect’s arrest);
id. at 781 (describing Colorado’s use of source-excluding partial matching to identify and
prosecute perpetrator of “car break-in where the burglar ‘left a drop of blood on a
passenger seat when he broke a car window and stole $1.40 in change’” (quoting P.
Solomon Banda, Police Debate Use of Family DNA to ID Suspects, Associated Press (Feb.
9, 2010, 4:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35317812/ns/technology_and_science
%20-science#.VNFLI8aprzJ (on file with the Columbia Law Review))); Familial Searching,
FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/familial-searching (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (“Since 2003, the UK has
conducted approximately 200 familial searches resulting in investigative information used
to help solve approximately 40 serious crimes (as of May 2011).”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 8–16 (describing Tyrone Holloway’s identification following source-
excluding partial match).
270. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing significant rate of false
positives); see also Mustian, supra note 64 (discussing false identification and investigation
of Usry resulting from partial match search of commercial genetic database containing
Usry’s father’s DNA).
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where, however, there is no sound basis for distinguishing between the
two.271 Significantly, both types of matches typically prompt additional,
intentionally undertaken genetic or other analysis, and so the use of
either should be considered intentional.272
Forensic familial identification constitutes an unlawful effort by the
government to encumber not only an offender’s interest in her identifia-
ble genetic information, but also the interest of the offender’s closest kin.
The ordinary rules of tenancy by the entirety forbid a single spouse from
encumbering the shared property without the consent of her partner.273
As an encumbrance describes rights held by those external to the mar-
ried pair,274 a government’s right to use DNA for forensic investigation
and identification constitutes an encumbrance on the interest of any
individual whose identifiable genetic information is exploited by this use.
A rule allowing use of source-excluding partial matches would encumber
the portions of identifiable genetic information shared between known
offenders and their close genetic relatives. Accordingly, under the frame-
work of tenancy by the entirety, courts should not sanction forensic use
of source-excluding partial matches, absent independent justification as
to the known offender’s kin. Similarly, state forensics laboratories should
reject expansions of their roles to include developing and relaying infor-
mation about source-excluding partial matches.275
The rule barring unilateral encumbrances has legal consequences
even as against the federal government. Consider federal forfeiture law.
Although courts typically have analyzed forensic genetic identification
under the Fourth Amendment,276 the notion of forfeiture is not foreign
to the Fourth Amendment.277 Courts frequently speak of defendants
271 . See Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 783–807 (describing and rejecting
justifications distinguishing fortuitous and deliberate partial matches).
272. Id. at 795–98 (emphasizing “differentiating between an intended result and an
unintended one . . . is difficult” due to ever-present possibility of inadvertent match).
273. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 282 (2002) (“Neither spouse may
unilaterally alienate or encumber the property, although this may be accomplished with
mutual consent.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894
F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[N]either spouse can sell, forfeit or encumber any part
of the estate without the consent of the other, nor can one spouse alone lease it or
contract for its disposition.” (alteration in original) (quoting Parrish v. Swearington, 379
So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
274. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 227, at 644 (defining “encumbrance”).
275 . As I have explained elsewhere, most policies governing forensic familial
identification exist, if at all, in state forensics lab manuals. Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at
776–78.
276. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–69 (2013) (classifying col-
lection of DNA by way of buccal swab as search under Fourth Amendment).
277. The Supreme Court’s recent reinvigoration of Fourth Amendment doctrine tied
to common law trespass further supports the invocation of property doctrines in discussing
Fourth Amendment protections. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012)
(noting property doctrine has figured in search and seizure protections since at least
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whose actions have thereby “forfeited” any reasonable expectation of
privacy in objects or information.278 Moreover, courts have addressed
criminal and civil forfeitures of entireties property directly in determin-
ing whether and in what forms the government may forfeit property.279
The legal burdens applicable to forfeitures also are largely similar to
those giving rise to the legal authority to take and analyze genetic mate-
rial—criminal conviction or at least probable cause.280 The law of crimi-
nal and civil forfeitures and the concept of tenancy by the entirety thus
provide an instructive framework for considering the appropriateness of
forensic familial identification.
Pursuant to the federal criminal forfeiture statute, the government
may forfeit property used in or derived from a statutory violation.281 As
criminal forfeiture requires a nexus to the defendant’s illegal conduct,
however, “only the defendant’s interest in property may be forfeited.”282
The interests of third parties are beyond the scope of forfeiture, “even if
the third party was fully aware of the criminal acts and the way the prop-
Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.), and arguing “text of the Fourth
Amendment reflects its close connection to property”).
278. See, e.g., Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (“She indisputably
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her blood when it was drawn, and she did
nothing to forfeit that expectation.”); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir.
2007) (“McClish did not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of
privacy when he opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within
his home from a warrantless arrest.”); United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1120 (7th
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“In the context of trash searches, a person is
considered to have knowingly exposed any trash that is ‘readily accessible’ to the public
(and thereby to have forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash).”); see
also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456, 1459 (1996) (“All of us begin with an entitlement
to privacy, but some seem by their actions to forfeit part of that entitlement. The idea of
forfeiture captures the intuition that guilty people really do not deserve the right when its
exercise consists of the concealment of incriminating evidence.”).
279. See infra notes 281–289, 293–301 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
conditions for forfeiture in criminal and civil contexts, and judicial interpretations
thereof).
280. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (concluding DNA analysis does not violate Fourth
Amendment where it accompanies “arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a
serious offense”); Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: An Analysis of
Developments in the Law Regarding the Inclusion of a Forfeiture Judgment in the
Sentence Imposed in a Criminal Case, 32 Am. J. Crim. L. 55, 57 (2004) [hereinafter
Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure] (explaining criminal forfeitures require
conviction); Guerra, supra note 173, at 369 (explaining in civil forfeiture actions,
government “need only establish probable cause to believe that the property is subject to
forfeiture, i.e., that someone has illegally used the property, be it the owner or another”
(internal citation omitted)).
281. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012) (establishing conditions and procedures for criminal
forfeiture).
282. Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18
S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 45, 59 (2008).
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erty was used to facilitate them.”283 More than one court has cautioned
that failure to exclude third-party interests from forfeiture where multi-
ple individuals have interests in a single parcel of real property “raises
serious constitutional concerns.”284 “If partial forfeitures are forbidden,
then a criminal’s activity may result in the forfeiture of an innocent third
party’s interest in property,” which “may thus constitute an unconstitu-
tional taking of a third party’s interest or a deprivation of that party’s
property without due process.”285
Courts considering criminal forfeitures where tenancies by the
entirety are at issue have often worked contortions in the law in order to
permit the government to forfeit its due while not encroaching on the
interest of a nondefendant spouse. Where a criminal defendant is a joint
tenant with an innocent party, the federal government’s forfeiture
authority takes the defendant’s interest in the property, presumably
severing the joint tenancy, destroying rights of survivorship, and creating
a tenancy in common with the innocent co-owner.286 But where a tenancy
by the entirety is at issue, the result is often quite different. For instance,
in United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, the Sixth Circuit held that, because
“entireties property may not be attached to satisfy the personal tax liabil-
ity of a single spouse,” “[w]hile the federal forfeiture scheme permits the
Government to assume Mr. Marks’ interest in the property, it may not by
virtue of the forfeiture alter the essential characteristics of the entireties
estate.”287 The court concluded that “the government could not execute
on a defendant’s interest in a tenancy by the entireties while the interest
was still intact, even if such interest was subject to forfeiture. To do so
would burden the interests of . . . third party owners in the criminal for-
283. Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil Asset
Forfeiture: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 Creates a Uniform Innocent
Owner Defense to Most Civil Forfeiture Cases Filed by the Federal Government, 89 Ky. L.J.
653, 705–06 (2000–2001); see also Garretson, supra note 282, at 59 (“[O]nly the
defendant’s interest in property may be forfeited.”).
284. Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 2004); accord United States v.
Totaro, 345 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2003) (“If this court were to deem forfeited the entire
estate despite a valid claim of partial ownership by a third party, . . . [i]t would . . . punish
the third party, against whom no jury has returned a verdict of guilt, and may therefore
raise constitutional questions of a whole different order.” (citation omitted)); see also
Pacheco, 393 F.3d at 354–55 (collecting and discussing cases).
285. Pacheco, 393 F.3d at 354.
286. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 392. The cases discussed herein consider
properties that were not purchased with the proceeds of the defendant’s crime. Where
criminal proceeds are used to purchase property, courts have sometimes found the
property forfeitable in full, notwithstanding a nondefendant spouse’s assertion of legal
interest in property held by the entireties or as community property. See United States v.
Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Because the ‘relation back doctrine’
operates to vest title in the Government to the proceeds of Martinez’ RICO activities as of
the time Martinez engaged in those illegal activities, these proceeds, and any property
purchased with the proceeds, never became community property.”).
287. 910 F.2d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 1990).
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feiture context.”288 Some courts have gone further still, holding that a
property held in tenancy by the entirety is not subject to federal forfei-
ture at all.289
Applied to identifiable genetic information, this framework suggests
that courts should constrain the government to using genetic infor-
mation it has lawfully obtained only to search for matches implicating the
matching offender—but not to search for matches implicating a match-
ing offender’s close genetic relatives. Where an individual has engaged in
conduct triggering the collection, analysis, and use of her DNA, she has
in effect forfeited her interest in keeping the limited information used
for forensic identification out of the hands of law enforcement. Using
that information to identify an exact match to a crime scene sample
intrudes only on that individual’s interest in identifiable genetic infor-
mation. Developing a source-excluding partial match using that same
genetic profile, by contrast, also invades the interests of close genetic
relatives in the shared portions of identifiable genetic information. In
effect, such matches forfeit the interests of close genetic relatives in some
portion of their identifiable genetic information. The criminal forfeiture
cases suggest that this constitutes an unlawful exercise of government
power—perhaps even one of constitutional magnitude.
The criminal forfeiture cases do not, however, fully resolve the issue
of forensic familial identification. Recall that Maryland v. King sustained
the taking of genetic information from individuals arrested for, but not
yet convicted of, serious offenses.290 The criminal forfeiture context,
which requires a criminal conviction, may therefore be underinclusive.291
Looking to the civil forfeiture context, however, yields the same result.
Civil forfeitures result from in rem proceedings against the property
itself.292 Unlike criminal forfeitures, civil forfeitures do not require proof
of an owner’s guilt; rather, they require the government to establish only
probable cause to believe that the property in question was involved in
unlawful conduct.293
Nonetheless, at least with respect to federal law, “[a]n innocent
owner’s interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfei-
288. United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (describing 2525
Leroy Lane); see also United States v. Jimerson, 5 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir. 1993)
(explaining forfeiture against guilty husband did not affect his wife’s interest in their
property owned by tenancy by the entirety because she “continues to hold an indivisible
one-half interest in the entire residence property”).
289. See United States v. Lee, 232 F.3d 556, 560–62 (7th Cir. 2000) (adopting this
rule with respect to criminal forfeiture of substitute asset).
290. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
291. See Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure, supra note 280, at 57 (“[I]t is
fundamental that there can be no forfeiture order in a criminal case unless the defendant
is convicted of an offense . . . .”).
292. Guerra, supra note 173, at 362.
293. Id. at 369.
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ture statute.”294 In considering the innocent owner defense to civil forfei-
ture, courts sometimes have tangled with contortions similar to those in
the criminal forfeiture context. Indeed, 2525 Leroy Lane held that the
result under the civil forfeiture law was the same as under the criminal
forfeiture statute.295 In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third
Circuit similarly held that an innocent spouse who holds otherwise
forfeitable property as a tenant by the entirety is entitled to retain the
“right to full and exclusive use and possession of the property during her
life, her protection against conveyance of or execution by third parties
upon her husband’s former interest, and her survivorship right.”296 And
as in the criminal forfeiture context, some courts have found entireties
properties beyond the scope of federal civil forfeiture where there is an
innocent spouse.297
Moreover, courts in the civil forfeiture context have implied, and
sometimes held, that forfeiture of property used in criminal activity with-
out any voluntary action by an innocent owner raises constitutional con-
294. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2012).
295. 910 F.2d 343, 350–51 (6th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d
1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (describing 2525 Leroy Lane as concluding that executing on
entireties property “would burden the interests of ‘innocent owners’ in the civil forfeiture
context, and of third party owners in the criminal forfeiture context” (internal citation
omitted)).
296. 949 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. $16,920.00 in U.S.
Currency, No. 1:06CV265, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31697, at *11–*17 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 17,
2008).
297. See United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“We simply find that the federal law protects an innocent owner’s interest, and when that
innocent owner’s interest comprises the whole of a property, nothing can be forfeited to
the government.”).
Congress’s enactment of a uniform severance provision in the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act of 2000 has not rendered the role of tenancy by the entirety moot. See 18
U.S.C. § 983(d)(5) (enabling court, when innocent owner has partial interest in tenancy
by the entirety, to order severance, transfer to government with compensation, or
retainment subject to government lien). Of the few cases considering this provision with
regard to property held as a tenancy by the entirety, at least three have concluded that the
property’s status as a tenancy by the entirety affects how forfeiture is accomplished. See
United States v. Coffman, No. 5:09-CR-181-KKC, 2014 WL 6750603, at *5–*6 (E.D. Ky. Dec.
1, 2014) (denying government’s motion for “order awarding it half of the rental income
from the rental properties” held by tenancy by the entirety because government could not
acquire defendant spouse’s interest in properties without “diminishing” nondefendant
spouse’s interest); $16,920.00 in U.S. Currency, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31697, at *7–*9
(concluding wholesale severance of property is inappropriate and granting innocent
spouse’s Rule 59(e) motion to permit that spouse to “retain the property subject to a lien
in favor of the Government to the extent of the forfeitable interest in the property”);
United States v. 8 Curtis Ave., No. 01-10995-RWZ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2585, at *3–*4 (D.
Mass. Feb. 25, 2003) (concluding, as Section 983(d)(5) “does not override the interests in
a tenancy by the entirety as defined by the state,” innocent spouse should be “entitled to
retain the property in question subject to a lien on Mr. Smith’s right of survivorship in
favor of the government”). These holdings accord roughly with the results reached in
2525 Leroy Lane and 1500 Lincoln Ave.
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cerns.298 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Supreme Court
reiterated that its cases have “implied that it would be difficult to reject
the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfei-
ture had been taken from him without his privity or consent.”299 The
Court has consistently distinguished between forfeitures in which prop-
erty was used without the owner’s consent and forfeitures in which, after
the owner “entrusted” the property to another user, the property was
used in a manner to which the owner did not consent.300 The Supreme
Court has implied, and other courts have held, that forfeitures of the lat-
ter type are constitutionally permissible, while forfeitures of the former
type are not.301
Relatedness to one arrested for a crime is more akin to the former
than the latter. Indeed, the distinction drawn in the civil forfeiture cases
tracks the involuntariness that typifies shared identifiable genetic infor-
mation. As previously discussed, close genetic relatives do not ordinarily
“consent” or “entrust” one another with their identifiable genetic infor-
mation for any purpose.302 Identifiable genetic information is shared
among these relatives as an involuntary product of biology, not consent.
While probable cause may exist as to an arrestee, thereby giving rise to
lawful use of that individual’s identifiable genetic information, no such
cause exists as to that individual’s close genetic relatives. And the fact
that the genetic profile of an arrestee contains at least some identifiable
298. One example of this reasoning can be found in a Michigan Supreme Court
decision, which the Supreme Court later affirmed:
We note the distinction between the situation in which a vehicle is used without
the owner’s consent and, although the owner consented to the use, it is used in a
manner to which the owner did not consent. In the former, the innocent owner’s
interest could not be abated. In the latter, as in the present case, the innocent
owner’s interest may be abated.
Michigan ex rel. Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor v. Bennis (Bennis I), 527 N.W.2d 483, 495 n.36
(Mich. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Bennis v. Michigan
(Bennis II), 516 U.S. 442, 446 (1996).
299. 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
300. See, e.g., Bennis II, 516 U.S. at 444–46 (1996) (affirming abatement of jointly-
owned vehicle where owner “entrusted” vehicle to her husband, who used it to meet with
prostitute, and observing Michigan Supreme Court “noted that, in its view, an owner’s
interest may not be abated when ‘a vehicle is used without the owner’s consent’”); Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689–90 (finding forfeiture appropriate because defendant company
“voluntarily entrusted” its yacht but noting possibility of different outcome if yacht were
taken without defendant’s privity or consent); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467
(1926) (“It is unnecessary . . . to inquire whether the police power . . . extends to the
confiscation of the property of innocent persons appropriated and used by the law breaker
without the owner’s consent, for here the offense . . . was committed by one entrusted by
the owner with the possession and use of the . . . vehicle.”).
301. See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text (providing cases to illustrate
forfeiture implications of distinction between property voluntarily entrusted and property
taken without consent or privity).
302. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text (describing phenomenon of
shared genetic information as result of biology, rather than consent).
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genetic information for her close genetic relatives should not permit the
government effectively to forfeit those relatives’ interests in that portion
of their identifiable genetic information; after all, the sharing involved is
involuntary. Accordingly, the law of government encumbrances once
again indicates that courts should refuse to bless the fruits of forensic
familial identification. Courts instead should hold that there is no lawful
basis for encroaching on the interests in identifiable genetic information
held by the close genetic relatives of arrestees. And state forensics
laboratories should consider carefully these constitutional and other
dimensions of approving disclosure of source-excluding partial matches.
In considering such questions, courts (and decisionmakers in state
forensics laboratories) might exclude from this rule parents identified
through genetic analysis of their children’s cells. Parents might be said to
have “entrusted” their offspring with their shared identifiable genetic
information by choosing to procreate and raise their biological chil-
dren.303 If so, then the tenancy by the entirety framework and the civil
forfeiture case law would indicate that parents have no cognizable
constitutional claim against the use of their children’s genetic profiles to
point a finger at them. But taking advantage of this tenuous loophole
would pose a significant risk to general use of source-excluding partial
matches. After all, were an investigation growing out of a partial match to
lead to a sibling or a child of the partially matching offender profile, that
303. See supra text accompanying note 177 (discussing parental procreation-as-
entrustment argument). An argument about volitional procreation would depend on
parents’ choice to raise their biological children, as developing source-excluding partial
matches requires not only a partial genetic match, but also identification of which
individuals might be the partially matching relative. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 315
(explaining process of investigators asking subjects about existence and identities of
subject’s children and parents). This second requirement turns on the degree to which
the social family reflects a genetic one.
In addition to parental procreation-as-entrustment, a second exception might be
argued as to children vis-à-vis their parents, based on parents’ authority to consent for
their minor children. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180–81 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding parents with control over entire premises of home may consent to search
of minor’s bedroom); Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to
Consent to Health Care, 3 Guttmacher Rep. on Pub. Pol’y, Aug. 2000, at 4, 4, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/4/gr030404.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“States have traditionally recognized the right of parents to make health care
decisions on their children’s behalf, on the presumption that before reaching the age of
majority (18 in all but four states), young people lack the experience and judgment to
make fully informed decisions.”). This potential exception would be time-limited. It would
exist only so long as the child remained incapable of independent consent. In the medical
context, parents would lose the right to make decisions for their children once those
children became mature enough to decide for themselves. See id. at 4 (“[C]ourts in some
states have adopted the so-called mature minor rule, which allows a minor who is
sufficiently intelligent and mature to understand the nature and consequences of a
proposed treatment to consent to medical treatment without consulting his or her parents
or obtaining their permission.”).
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match, and all that flowed from it, might well be deemed “fruit of the
poisonous tree” subject to suppression.304
Whatever the legal standard for invading an individual’s interest in
her identifiable genetic information—and King suggests that that stand-
ard is probable cause, at least for some types of infractions305—that stand-
ard is not met with respect to individuals targeted through a source-
excluding partial match. No basis for database inclusion or database
search of their genetic information exists until after a partial match has
been discovered, investigated, and found to be informative. But the
Constitution does not permit intrusion of protected interests to be justi-
fied with information discovered after the fact.306
Moreover, in the course of investigating a partial match, law enforce-
ment officers will inevitably have intruded on the privacy of innocent per-
sons. By conducting searches that may turn up source-excluding partial
matches, whether fortuitously or deliberately, the government implicitly
searches the identifiable genetic information that each close genetic rela-
tive of every databased individual shares with her databased kin.307 This
would be so even if every source-excluding partial match were a true
match, rather than a false positive—a dubious proposition indeed.308
Accordingly, the tenancy by the entirety framework indicates that, even
where an individual’s identifiable genetic information is lawfully stored
in CODIS, courts should not bless the use of that information to target
close genetic relatives. Nor should state forensics laboratories enable
such use. Using source-excluding partial matches constitutes an unlawful
encumbrance of individuals’ identifiable genetic information that is
shared with their databased kin.309
304. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006) (describing suppressible
“fruit of the poisonous tree” as evidence that “has been come at by exploitation of”
“illegal actions of the police” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
305. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (“In light of the context of a
valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not
offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks.”).
306. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (“The reasonableness of official
suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their
search.”); United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 524 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[R]easonable
suspicion must exist at the time the officer stops an individual; it cannot come after the
fact.” (internal citation omitted)).
307. See Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 794 (“[E]very database search raises the
possibility of discovering a partial match, and so every database search accomplishes
implicit inclusion regardless of whether, how often, or how deliberately such matches are
found.”).
308. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing rates of false positives).
309. Looking only to Fourth Amendment precedent would likely yield the same
result. In Georgia v. Randolph, for instance, the Supreme Court held that “a physically
present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails” over another co-occupant’s
consent to a search of the shared premises. 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). But the Court
explained that the permissibility of a search premised on co-occupant consent is grounded
on co-occupants having “assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
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The answers that flow from the tenancy by the entirety framework,
however, are not free from doubt. As set forth above, partial matches
have proven pivotal in solving some serious crimes. 310 A complete
prohibition on their use may deprive investigators of an important tool—
yielding inefficiencies in criminal investigation.311 After all, “[t]he chief
justification given for embracing partial match reporting is that it enables
investigators to solve more crimes. All else being equal, increasing the
scope of coverage in CODIS will enable more genetic identifications,
which will likely solve more crimes.”312
But that is not the only way to view efficiency in the realm of partial
match reporting. As Erin Murphy has argued, “[t]he use of effective
familial search methods to identify crime suspects . . . has the potential to
harm, rather than aid, police investigations.”313 Partial match reporting
may “cause investigators to rely on genetic leads at the expense of more
traditional lines of investigation—essentially a fear of overreliance.”314
Moreover, “genetic dependence can also be an issue when a source is
found, because in those cases the genetic evidence may so dominate and
shape the course of any subsequent investigation that it inevitably taints
the results.”315 These concerns are especially likely to manifest with
respect to source-excluding partial matches due to the significant rate of
false-positives.316 As one recent study warned, “some groups may have
common area to be searched.” Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted). A close
genetic relative, as explained, has “assumed” no such risk. Moreover, the link between
close genetic relatives, unlike the link between co-occupants, cannot be severed.
Accordingly, like the forfeiture cases, the Fourth Amendment cases governing shared
living spaces suggest that forensic familial identification may be constitutionally
problematic. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 336–37 (discussing forensic familial
identification in light of co-occupant cases). But see Kaye, supra note 112, at 162 n.328
(rejecting argument that occupants’ rights to challenge police searches of shared spaces
legitimate familial rights to challenge policy scrutiny of overlapping DNA).
310. See supra note 269 (collecting reports of successful criminal investigations).
311. See Kaye, supra note 112, at 140–42 (noting searches avoid costs of “blind alleys
and unnecessary and disturbing investigations of innocent persons”); Kimberly A. Wah,
Note, A New Investigative Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29
Whittier L. Rev. 909, 920–23, 929–31 (2008) (discussing potential of familial DNA
searching to narrow suspect list); cf. Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman
Response to Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 141, 170–73
(describing benefits of familial DNA investigations to innocent individuals).
312. Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 788.
313. Murphy, supra note 18, at 309; see also Ram, Fortuity, supra note 61, at 802–03
(discussing this argument).
314. Murphy, supra note 18, at 309.
315. Id.
316 . See, e.g., Mustian, supra note 64 (discussing instance of false positive
identification and investigation of Usry through partial matching); Ram, Fortuity, supra
note 61, at 764–65 (discussing “significant rate” of false positives presented by partial
matching); Murphy, supra note 18, at 317 (describing impact of false positives generated
by partial match searches); supra note 64 and accompanying text (collecting sources
analyzing error rates in forensic familial identification).
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higher rates of false identification . . . raising questions about the prac-
ticality of familial searching.”317 On this view, prohibiting the use of
source-excluding partial matches may in fact enhance investigative effi-
ciency, by limiting the effect of genetic dependence and encouraging a
more efficient deployment of limited investigative resources.318
B. Genetic Research
Genetic research can expose intensely private medical details,
including details not previously known to the person whose genome is
under examination.319 Moreover, with the rise of whole-genome and
genome-wide research, “[d]ata obtained from genome sequencing reveal
information not only about the individual who is the source of the DNA,
but also probabilistic information about the DNA sequence of close
genetic relatives.”320 The benefits and risks associated with these new
frontiers in genetic research are thus open to and imposed on close
genetic relatives of research participants.321 The question then becomes
whose informed consent to participation in research is required.
This is a domain in which federal regulators are well positioned to
act. In the United States, research involving human subjects conducted
using federal monies must comply with federal research regulations
known as the Common Rule.322 The scope of human subjects research
extends to genetic research in which DNA sources are “individually
identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascer-
tained by the investigator or associated with the information).”323 The
Common Rule imposes significant requirements for informed consent to
participation in research.324 The FDA imposes similar requirements for
317. Rohlfs et al., Familial Identification, supra note 64, at 9.
318. More bluntly, the Fourth Amendment itself envisions inefficiencies in criminal
investigation. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (2006) (“A generalized
interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a warrantless
search.”).
319. See Privacy and Progress, supra note 118, at 25 (“[H]aving one’s whole genome
sequenced today could reveal genetic variants that increase the risk for certain conditions
such as Alzheimer’s disease, which many people either do not want to know about
themselves or others to know about them.”).
320. McGuire et al., Research Ethics, supra note 75, at 154.
321. See Privacy and Progress, supra note 118, at 24 (“[A] decision to learn about
our own genomic makeup might inadvertently tell us something about our relatives or tell
them something about their own genomic makeup that they did not already know and
perhaps do not want to know.”).
322. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.409 (2013); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., http://www.hhs.
gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Mar. 24, 2015) (describing Common Rule).
323. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f).
324 . See id. § 46.116(a) (stating each research subject will receive significant
information, including “description of any reasonably foreseeable risks” and benefits of
research and statement of confidentiality policy).
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all studies submitted for its review. 325 Accordingly, these actors are
primed to consider appropriate regulation of informed consent to
genetic research in view of the shared nature of identifiable genetic
information.
As in the forensic context, the relevant rule of tenancy by the
entirety that carries force here mandates that “‘neither spouse can sell,
forfeit or encumber any part of the estate without the consent of the
other, nor can one spouse alone lease it or contract for its disposition.’”326
Where one family member consents to the use of wide swaths of her
genome for research purposes, this may amount to an encumbrance or
contract for the disposition of the identifiable genetic information that
that individual shares with her close genetic relatives. Both constitute
unilateral actions by an individual that impact the shared interests of all
involved. Moreover, consent to genetic research is consent to the use and
exploitation of one’s genetic information by individuals and institutions
external to the family, indicating that such use constitutes an external
encumbrance rather than an internal use.327
On this view, consent to the research use of identifiable genetic
information should require the agreement of each close genetic relative
whose identifiable genetic information also will be exposed. Obtaining
this agreement will be easier some times than others. Empirical research
indicates that most people will freely grant broad consent for the use of
their genetic information in research.328 But obtaining agreement may be
considerably more difficult in large families where one must secure
agreement from many individuals. Agreement may be impossible to
come by where family members are unknown to or estranged from one
another. And a strict requirement of mutual consent gives each family
member a unilateral veto on participation by anyone in the family—a
harsh result if there is one naysayer in a family otherwise interested in
research participation. Ultimately, the burden of securing consent may
be so great as to dissuade many potential research participants.
Such a result raises serious concerns about the justice and efficiency
of a mutual-consent requirement. Potential research participants,
researchers, and society at large benefit from the progress of science
325. See 21 C.F.R. § 50 (2014) (providing rules protecting human subjects during
clinical tests regulated by FDA).
326. United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Parrish v. Swearington, 379 So. 2d 185, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (per curiam)).
327. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 227, at 644 (defining “encumbrance”);
cf. 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.03(4) (“Each tenant by the entirety is entitled . . . to
protect [the entire property] against outsiders . . . .”).
328 . Cf. Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 114, at 1459–60 (concluding most
individuals will generally consent to research without hearing particular details as to type
of research).
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through research.329 Courts have consistently refused to recognize legal
claims that might “chill” or “cripple” medical research.330 The mutual
consent demanded by the tenancy by the entirety framework might well
invite such “chill[ing].” Indeed, the potential for hold-up in the research
context is even greater than in the law of tenancy by the entirety itself, in
light of the more numerous interested parties to genetic research.331 It is
not clear that the benefits of control and consent over one’s shared
identifiable genetic information would be worth such costs to research
and research stakeholders.
Yet, there is good reason to believe such concerns are overstated and
the burdens associated with mutual consent are not prohibitive.
For one thing, the mutual consent model suggested by the tenancy
by the entirety framework has some explanatory force for policies already
in place or recommended by experts. The agreement between the Lacks
family and the NIH governing access to HeLa genome data demonstrates
that something approaching shared decisionmaking is possible. And
while experts have agreed that the Lacks agreement responded to
unique circumstances, 332 the notion of joint decisionmaking on a
broader scale is not so outlandish a proposition. Consent processes
approaching joint decisionmaking are already being put into place. For
instance, the Personal Genome Project, which “is dedicated to creating
public genome, health, and trait data,”333 “tries to involve the community
as broadly as possible, recognizing that individualized consent is limited
by the risk posed to relatives who do not consent.”334 More broadly,
bioethicists have recognized that joint decisionmaking in this arena is not
prohibitive; in fact, it may be ethically obligatory. Bioethicists writing in
scientific journals have acknowledged that, as a general matter, “[a]s the
risks to relatives increase, the ethical obligations towards them inten-
sify.”335 These scholars recommend that “investigators should take a
329. Ram, Assigning Rights, supra note 111, at 135–38 (discussing impact of broad
interest in obtaining information about diseases and other health conditions).
330. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1070, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing both claim of failure to obtain informed consent
and claim of conversion due in part to concerns about “chill[ing]” or “crippl[ing]”
medical research); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal.
1990) (emphasizing need not to threaten “innocent parties who are engaged in socially
useful activities” with “disabling civil liability”).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 239–241 (noting maximum of two interested
parties in tenancy-by-the-entirety context compared with multiplicity of interested parties
in genetic-material context).
332. See Callaway, Deal Done, supra note 1, at 133 (“In discussing HeLa cells and the
agreement forged with the family, Collins and others often use the word ‘unique’ . . . . The
NIH does not see the deal with the family as a guide to handling other human samples.”).
333 . Sharing Personal Genomes, Pers. Genome Project, http://www.personal
genomes.org/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
334. Sokhansanj, supra note 88, at 302.
335. McGuire et al., Research Ethics, supra note 75, at 154.
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family-centered approach to informed consent (an approach that has
already been embraced in many research ethics guidelines).”336 And
these recommendations contemplate an “obligation to include at-risk
relatives” that “increases with the degree of relatedness to the primary
research subject.”337 An “interdisciplinary consensus workshop” includ-
ing twenty-three prominent bioethicists from the United States, United
Kingdom, and Canada similarly concluded that, “[a]s part of the consent
and ethics review process, the issues associated with family members and
relevant groups and populations should be considered (this may, for
example, involve encouraging/requiring discussions with family mem-
bers).”338 The framework of tenancy by the entirety generally accords
with these views.
The law of tenancy by the entirety also indicates that the Icelandic
Supreme Court appropriately honored a young woman’s request that
“the genealogical or genetic information on [her] father should not be
transferred into the database.”339 Tenancy by the entirety provides for
rights of survivorship—upon the death of one spouse, “the whole must
remain to the survivor.”340 That is effectively what the Icelandic Supreme
Court granted to the appellant in Gu∂mundsdóttir. As the Icelandic
Supreme Court explained, Gu∂mundsdóttir could not exercise on her
father’s behalf her father’s right to exclude his information from the
database.341 Rather, after her father died, Gu∂mundsdóttir was able to
exercise the right to control her own identifiable genetic information
that was present in her father’s cells.342 That looks considerably like a
survivorship right.
For another, three caveats may blunt the difficulty of what the ten-
ancy by the entirety framework might demand in the context of genetic
research. First, the approach suggested by the law of tenancy by the
entirety may not require mutual consent where close genetic relatives are
missing or unknown. Under Massachusetts’s law of tenancy by the
entirety, for instance, a single owner of an entireties property may obtain
authorization to dispose of the property unilaterally where her spouse
has “left . . . and does not intend to return.”343 Lack of knowledge of a
spouse’s whereabouts for a year or more constitutes “prima facie evi-
dence” supporting unilateral disposition of the entireties property.344 For
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Caulfield et al., supra note 72, at 430, 434.
339. Gu∂mundsdóttir v. Iceland [Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 2003, No. 151/2003, at 4
(Ice.), available at https://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
340. Orth, supra note 225, at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
341. Gu∂mundsdóttir, No. 151/2003, at 4.
342. Id. at 10.
343. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 30 (2013).
344. Id.
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individuals who are adopted, mutual consent from genetic parents and
siblings might not be required to participate in genetic research for simi-
lar reasons. Where such individuals do not know the whereabouts of
their genetic relatives (and cannot easily obtain that information), unilat-
eral disposition may be appropriate. The same result likely would obtain
with respect to parents who have not been actively involved in the lives of
their genetic children.
Second, the doctrine of waste may provide a tool for limiting the
ability of one or more unreasonable naysayers to prevent participation in
research. The doctrine of waste becomes relevant “whenever two or more
persons . . . have rights to possess property at the same time.”345 While
states have varied in their application of the doctrine of waste to property
held by the entireties,346 applying the doctrine of waste in the context of
interests in shared identifiable genetic information seems sensible. This
doctrine limits each owner’s ability to use the property in a manner “that
unreasonably interferes with the expectations of” other owners.347 The
doctrine gained purchase both because interest-holders might include
children or the unborn and because co-owners were “locked into dealing
with each other”—a relatively fixed, and sometimes involuntary, arrange-
ment.348 Limiting the impact of unreasonable refusals to consent (or
unreasonable consents and unreasonable refusals to respond at all), akin
to a doctrine of waste, would temper the impact of the mutual consent
requirement otherwise suggested under the tenancy by the entirety
framework. Moreover, as the doctrine of waste has applied to restrain
unreasonable conduct between co-owners bound together involuntarily,
that doctrine can assist us more broadly in accommodating the tenancy
by the entirety framework to the involuntary nature of interests in shared
identifiable genetic information.
Third, mutual consent may be necessary only in the context of
whole-genome and genome-wide research. The law of tenancy by the
entirety is concerned with property in which multiple individuals have
cognizable interests. 349 That law can help inform the regulation of
345. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 241.
346. See, e.g., In re Hamilton’s Estate, 260 A.2d 232, 234 (N.J. App. Div. 1969)
(discussing “nature of an estate by the entirety” and observing “each spouse is protected
against waste by the other”); Kawalis v. Kawalis, 53 N.Y.S.2d 162, 166 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(“If . . . a tenant by the entirety may alone sue a third party for damages . . . then by
analogy or parity of reasoning it is difficult to see why such suits may not be maintained by
one tenant by the entirety against the other . . . .”). See generally 7 Powell, supra note 190,
§ 52.03(4) (“Each tenant by the entirety is entitled . . . to be protected against waste by the
other spouse.”). But see Stuckey v. Keefe’s Executor, 26 Pa. 397, 401 (1856) (“These
incidents cannot exist in an estate held by husband and wife. No action of partition, or
waste, or account, or ejectment, can be maintained by one against the other.”).
347. Dukeminier et al., supra note 184, at 241.
348. Id. (describing Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 92 (8th ed. 2011)).
349. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 280–82 (2002) (discussing tenancy by
entirety as relating specifically to married individuals, who are jointly interested).
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research only for research that in fact exposes the identifiable genetic
information of multiple individuals. Consistent with current federal
regulations governing human genetic research, therefore, consent is
unnecessary where genetic information is successfully de-identified or
anonymized.350 If anonymity is preserved as to whose DNA is on display,
genetic information is by definition no longer identifiable. Research
using such genetic information does not trigger the tenancy by the
entirety framework at all, as no identifiable genetic information is at
issue.351 Re-identification and de-anonymization are most likely to occur,
and to have informational consequences for an individual’s genetic rela-
tives, in the context of whole-genome and genome-wide research.
Researchers have demonstrated repeatedly that genomes sequenced in
whole-genome or genome-wide research can be traced back to identifia-
ble individuals despite de-identification efforts. 352 While “traditional
research promised confidentiality and/or anonymity to participants,
advances in DNA technology may render these safeguards
meaningless.”353 Moreover, where re-identification occurs, whole-genome
and genome-wide research are likely to involve sufficiently large troves of
data from which significant information can be gleaned about both the
individual whose cells were used and her close genetic relatives.354
Genetic information used in research concentrating on small (or univer-
sally shared) portions of the genome, conversely, is less likely be to re-
identified or sufficiently individually informative as to require mutual
consent consistent with the tenancy by the entirety framework.
C. Personal Genetic Testing
Personal genetic testing stands on significantly different ground
from forensic familial identification and large-scale genetic research.
While forensic and research uses of identifiable genetic information give
individuals and institutions outside the family access to that information,
350. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2002) (enumerating eighteen identifiers,
removal of which renders what would otherwise be protected health information “de-
identifi[ed]” and outside scope of Privacy Rule of HIPAA); Office of Human Research
Prots., supra note 78 (reaffirming review and consent obligations ordinarily applicable to
federally funded research do not apply to research using biological specimens that are not
“individually identifiable”).
351. But see Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 114, at 1460 (reporting more than 10%
of survey respondents indicated they believed consent should be required for additional
research using research-derived samples that have been stripped of personally identifying
information).
352. See Lunshof et al., supra note 82, at 409 (“Developments in both medical
informatics and bioinformatics show that the guarantee of absolute privacy and
confidentiality is not a promise that medical and scientific researchers can deliver any
longer.”); see also supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (identifying difficulty of
maintaining privacy in DNA research).
353. Mitchell et al., supra note 82, at 309.
354. McGuire et al., Research Ethics, supra note 75, at 154.
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personal genetic testing enables individual use of identifiable genetic
information. Genetic testing typically is undertaken for one’s own enrich-
ment rather than for the enrichment of non-family members.355 Such
testing generally also is protected from prying eyes by existing doctrines
of doctor–patient confidentiality356 or contractual assurances of secu-
rity.357 As such, personal genetic testing is more akin to an exercise of
“the right to use the property” than an effort to encumber the
property.358
The framework of tenancy by the entirety suggests that, unlike
participating in genetic research, individuals are entitled to pursue per-
sonal genetic testing without familial consent. Modern tenancy by the
entirety gives each spouse “equal right to the control, use, possession,
rents, income, and profits of real property held by them in tenancy by
the entirety.”359 Each owner of an entireties property generally retains the
full and unilateral right to use the property as she sees fit.360 With respect
to identifiable genetic information, this approach suggests that each fam-
ily member retains a unilateral right to learn about the genetic infor-
mation in her cells—even if that information is germane to others of her
kin. An individual who pursues such testing, however, may be obligated
to share the “profits” of that testing—giving those close genetic relatives
who ask access to her test results.
These are policies that federal regulators again may best be suited to
implement. Disclosure of identifiable health information, including
identifiable genetic information, is already regulated at the federal level
through HIPAA.361 The FDA has already acted to curtail certain aspects
unverified medical genetic test marketing direct to consumers.362 And
insofar as personal genetic testing constitutes commercial rather than
355. See 23andMe, supra note 99, (inviting users to “[f]ind out what your DNA says
about you and your family”).
356. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (“We hold today
that a duty of confidentiality arises from the physician–patient relationship and that a
violation of that duty, resulting in damages, gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort
against the physician.”). But see infra note 367 and accompanying text (discussing possible
exception to doctor–patient confidentiality requiring physician to warn patient’s family
members of serious genetic risk).
357. See How It Works, 23andMe, supra note 101 (“Your personalized 23andMe web
account provides secure and easy access to your information, with multiple levels of
encryption and security protocols protecting your personal information.”).
358. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 227, at 644 (defining “encumbrance”).
359. Orth, supra note 225, at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
360. 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.03(4) (“Each tenant by the entirety is entitled to
possess the entire property.”).
361. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2014) (detailing permitted uses and disclosures
for certain de-identified health information).
362. Warning Letter, supra note 97 (ordering company to cease marketing its Saliva
Collection Kit and Personal Genome Service because of failure to comply with Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act).
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medical activity, it is subject to a modicum of oversight by the Federal
Trade Commission.363
Existing legal and bioethical rules generally accord with the require-
ments flowing from the tenancy by the entirety framework. That is not
altogether surprising, given that existing rules generally treat genetic
information individualistically,364 while the tenancy by the entirety frame-
work would allow individuals generally to act unilaterally notwithstanding
the shared interests involved. Thus, medical personnel and commercial
enterprises engaged in personal genetic testing typically seek authoriza-
tion for testing only from the individual whose cells the company ana-
lyzes.365 More interestingly, bioethical norms and even some case law
have indicated that an obligation to share the results of genetic testing
may exist. At least one court has expressly recognized that physicians
involved in genetic testing are legally obligated to take “reasonable
steps . . . to assure that the [genetic testing] information reaches those
likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit.”366 Biomedical
ethicists similarly have concluded that individuals seeking genetic testing,
or their physicians, may in some instances be expected to disclose genetic
testing results to at-risk family members.367
363. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2012) (granting Federal Trade Commission power to
investigate any corporation engaged in commerce). The Federal Trade Commission “has
asserted that it has jurisdiction over genetic testing advertising,” although “it appears to
have taken no action against any genetic test advertisements.” Genetics & Pub. Pol’y Ctr.,
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Empowering or Endangering the Public? 2 (2008),
available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/2006_DTC_Issue_Brief.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
364. See supra Part II (describing individualistic nature of recognized legal interests
in DNA).
365. See, e.g., How It Works, 23andMe, supra note 101 (explaining individual
seeking genetic analysis must order DNA kit and “register your specific bar code number”
prior to submitting saliva sample).
366. Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
Courts have given conflicting responses as to whether a duty to warn at-risk family
members exists at all, and whether any such duty may be discharged simply by warning the
patient. Compare Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (holding any duty
physician might bear to warn patient’s family members about genetic risk “will be satisfied
by warning the patient”), with Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192 (“We decline to hold . . . that, in all
circumstances, the duty to warn will be satisfied by informing the patient.”).
367. Inst. of Med., Assessing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy
278 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) (recommending disclosure of genetic risk to
relatives “only when elicit[ing] voluntary disclosure fail[s],” “high probability of
irreversible or fatal harm [exists],” “disclosure of information will prevent harm . . . [and]
is limited to the information necessary for diagnosis or treatment of the relative,” and
“there is no other reasonable way to avert . . . harm”); Opinion 2.131—Disclosure of
Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, Am. Med. Ass’n (Dec. 2003), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2131
.page (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Physicians also should identify circum-
stances under which they would expect patients to notify biological relatives of the
availability of information related to risk of disease.”).
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Insofar as such a result seems inadequately protective of the interests
of close genetic relatives in their identifiable genetic information, the
doctrine of waste may once again provide a limiting principle as to what
individuals may do with their cells.368 The tenancy by the entirety frame-
work may be underprotective because it gives an individual no role in the
decision of any of her close genetic relatives to pursue genetic testing,
even though that testing may reveal information with a profound impact
on her. Personal genetic testing may deliver information about an array
of medical traits and familial connections. 369 At least one direct-to-
consumer genetic testing firm, 23andMe, also invites its users to “[f]ind
relatives across continents.”370 The company explains, “[y]ou’ll likely dis-
cover dozens or even hundreds of relatives who share DNA and ancestors
[with you].” 371 This information clearly implicates the identifiable
genetic information of close genetic relatives, even if they do not partici-
pate in genetic testing themselves. Revelation of medical or other mark-
ers in one family member reflects an increased risk or certainty that
another close family member has the same marker.372 And features like
23andMe’s ancestry-related genetic reports have exposed mistaken pater-
nity and siblings given up for adoption—again, even where crucial
368. See 7 Powell, supra note 190, § 52.03(4), at 52-24 (“Each tenant by the entirety
is entitled to possess the entire property . . . and to be protected against waste by the other
spouse.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stratton v. Stratton, No. 4615-09, 2013 WL 2249155,
at *4–*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 2013) (explaining under New York’s law of tenancy by the
entirety, action for receivership may be appropriate where one owner’s interest in
entireties property is “in danger of being lost, damaged or destroyed” (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 6401(a))); supra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing state application of
doctrine of waste to property held in tenancy by the entirety).
In addition, it is not clear how frequently personal genetic testing takes place without
future research use also playing a role. As 23andMe has indicated in announcing new
research arrangements with Genentech and Pfizer, “of 23andMe’s genotyped population
of over 800,000 individuals, . . . more than 80 percent have consented to participate in
research.” 23andMe, Pfizer Press Release, supra note 81 (announcing collaboration with
Pfizer); see also 23andMe, Genentech Press Release, supra note 81 (announcing
collaboration with Genentech). Accordingly, as many as 80% of individuals seeking
personal genetic testing may in addition be bound by policies governing genetic research.
Insofar as commercial genetic databases come to be used for purposes of forensic
investigation as well, such use complicates individual consent for personal genetic testing
still further. See Mustian, supra note 64 (discussing investigation of Usry stemming from
false positive partial match identified in search of commercial genetic database containing
Usry’s father’s DNA).
369. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (providing examples of available
clinical tests for diseases and genetic markers).
370. Ancestry, 23andMe, supra note 90.
371. Id.
372. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (explaining gene inheritance
and possible consequences).
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participants in those social events (like the parents) are not 23andMe
customers and may well have preferred to keep those facts hidden.373
The tenancy by the entirety framework, in combination with the doc-
trine of waste, may suggest differing responses to different types of per-
sonal genetic testing. This framework would provide the greatest protec-
tion for unilateral genetic testing for genetic markers associated with
medical information, particularly medical information susceptible to
environmental or behavioral responses. Such information is the most
personal, relevant, and likely to spur changes in one’s behavior for medi-
cal benefit. The framework would, by contrast, provide the least protec-
tion for unilateral genetic testing for familial connections. Such testing
has the possibility of disrupting core familial relationships, perhaps with-
out significant countervailing benefit (especially where curiosity alone
drives such testing or it occurs over familial objections). Indeed, where
previously undisclosed infidelity is revealed, personal genetic testing for
familial connections may be said to have destroyed or irreparably dam-
aged the shared interest at stake, by revealing that it is not shared at all.
Accordingly, while personal genetic testing may continue to be handled
on an individual basis, the tenancy by the entirety framework may call for
more familial involvement—at least by an individual’s (putative) par-
ents—where ancestral information is the aim of testing.
CONCLUSION
Courts, agencies, and legislatures have accepted that individuals
have significant and cognizable interests in their identifiable genetic
information. Many individuals appear similarly interested in protecting
their identifiable genetic information from prying eyes. But the rules that
these institutions embrace are largely underinclusive because they fail to
take seriously the inconvenient fact that identifiable genetic information
is involuntarily and immutably shared with close genetic relatives. As this
Article has demonstrated, accounting for shared interests in identifiable
genetic information is not simple.
The law of tenancy by the entirety suggests one possible approach to
accommodating the interest each close genetic relative has in that por-
tion of identifiable genetic information that she shares with the others.
Both kinds of interests call for the difficult task of thinking about multi-
ple persons “as though they were one.”374 The tenancy by the entirety
framework gives rise to concrete proposals for taking shared interests in
373. See Engber, supra note 104 (explaining possibility of discovering new or
unsuspected relations via genetic reports); Hill, supra note 104 (discussing discovery of
full genetic siblings using 23andMe, where one sibling had been placed for adoption and
his existence had been previously unknown to other sibling); 23andMe, If I Am Adopted,
supra note 104 (“There is . . . the possibility of finding a much closer relative—including a
parent or sibling.”).
374. Orth, supra note 225, at 40.
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identifiable genetic information into account in forensic identification,
genetic research, and personal genetic testing. In some of these domains,
experts are already advocating policies consistent with this framework.
The tenancy by the entirety framework thus illuminates how
decisionmakers might approach the difficult problem of accounting for
interests in shared identifiable genetic information. This framework is
consistent with a vision of justice that grants each individual some right
to control when and how her identifiable genetic information becomes
available to outsiders. It may also, in some contexts, bring about efficient
results. If courts, agencies, and legislatures mean what they say—that an
individual’s interest in her identifiable genetic information is worthy of
legal protection—then these legal institutions must do more to
accommodate the full scope of this interest. A framework drawing on
tenancy by the entirety provides a good place to start.
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